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ABSTRACT
The Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age was created to
produce recommendations on how to best leverage intelligence and information to improve
security without compromising existing civil liberties. Their second report proposed that the
government set up an information-sharing network using currently available technology to
improve our ability to prevent terrorist attacks, while protecting civil liberties. The Markle
recommendations have been incorporated into the recent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. The proposition is that the Markle task force recommendations are
sufficient to achieve the required data integration in the United States. To affirm or falsify the
proposition, three existing systems will be reviewed: Alabama’s Law Enforcement Tactical
System Portal (LETS), Florida’s Statewide Data Sharing Effort (FINDER), and Orange County,
Florida’s Integrated Criminal Justice System.
This study found that there is no overall model for national intelligence analysis that
incorporates the capabilities that law enforcement has for collection and analysis in with the
federal capabilities for collection and analysis. This may ultimately limit the regional systems’
success. Recommendations for potential initial models are made. In addition, recommendations
for improvement in each regional system are provided. Finally, further research is needed to
refine a national intelligence analysis model that can be supported by a distributed information
sharing network.
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CHAPTER ONE: PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Introduction
The year is 2001. The Intelligence Community (IC) budget has remained under pressure
and manpower cuts have continued, but bureaucratic politics and legislative prerogatives have
perpetuated about a dozen national-level agencies and forced a further division of analytic
labor. By the turn of the century, analysis had become dangerously fragmented. The Community
could still collect "facts," but analysts had long ago been overwhelmed by the volume of
available information and were no longer able to distinguish consistently between significant
facts and background noise. The quality of analysis had become increasingly suspect. And, as
had been true of virtually all previous intelligence failures, collection was not the issue. The data
were there, but we had failed to recognize fully their significance and put them in context. At a
time when the interrelationship among political, economic, military, social, and cultural factors
had become increasingly complex, no agency was postured to conduct truly integrated analysis.
From the vantage point of 2001, intelligence failure is inevitable. (Travers (1997, ¶ 1)
Due to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the prediction became undeniably
true, and the clamor for better information sharing between intelligence agencies began.

As a

result of this, the Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age (Fleishman)
was created. This is a group of leading national security experts from the administrations of
Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush. It was created to
produce some answers on how to best leverage intelligence and information to improve security
without compromising existing civil liberties.
The report concluded that by using currently available technology, the government is able to
set up a network that substantially improves our ability to prevent terrorist attacks and protect
civil liberties… (They) outlined details for the necessary elements of a proposed Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network that would more
1
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effectively combat terrorism than does our current system, while protecting privacy.” (Baird
& Barksdale, August 31, 2004).
In this thesis, the Markle Foundation’s recommendations in its second report, Creating a
Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security (Markle, 2003) are reviewed within the
context of the overall intelligence agency reform effort set forth in the 9-11 Commission (9-11
Commission, August 21, 2004) Report, and other intelligence community writings.
Statement of Purpose
It is evident that the intelligence community was created in a different era, for a different
purpose than is relevant to today’s threat situation. Existing legislation intended to address our
ability to respond to terrorist threats focuses on organizational structure, not on business
processes within the organizations. Similarly, existing recommendations for information sharing
focus on preserving the status quo within independent agency systems, while sharing whatever
data is there to be shared. Given the substantial change in the frame-of-reference from the old
threat environment to the new threat environment, neither the legislation nor the information
sharing recommendations is likely to be overly successful in the long run. The FBI’s recent
$170 million failure in its Virtual Case File System provides evidence of how a frame-ofreference change can contribute to overall software failure. “Initiated in June 2001, the Virtual
Case File System suffered from having to adapt to the FBI’s dramatic post-9/11 mission change,
which called upon the bureau to focus on preventing terrorism as much as fighting more
conventional crimes” (Greenemeier, 2005)

2
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At the root of the Markle Foundations recommendations 1 was a desire to come up with a
mechanism to integrate local law enforcement intelligence and enforcement activities that are
primarily focused toward crime prevention with national intelligence that is more directed
towards terrorism. Ultimately, a single national system and process for intelligence information
sharing should be the implementation result. The purpose of this study is to evaluate existing
regional initiatives within the context of the Markle recommendations, and use that information
to identify policy implications and possible insufficiencies in the recommendation. In addition,
it will recommend a process and technology-based framework for intelligence information
sharing. This framework will be designed to support new intelligence collection and analysis
processes from the ground up, without being dependent on large-scale agency reorganization.

Rationale
Historically there has been a clear distinction between the methods and business
objectives of local law enforcement intelligence and those of national security intelligence
agencies. The missions and customers of the agencies involved in local law enforcement are
very different from those of national intelligence organizations. Local law enforcement
performs intelligence functions with the ultimate goal of increasing local public safety. National
intelligence organizations perform intelligence functions with the goal of detecting and
preventing incidents that threaten our country and its inhabitants as a whole. We need to be able

1

The recommendations included: A directive to the President to create Executive Orders to set up a decentralized
information-sharing network, a directive to the President to create an Executive Order to govern the TTIC, a
directive to DHS to coordinate efforts with state, local and private sector entities, a directive to the FBI to share
information with state and local law enforcement, a directive to all agencies to create ways to produce more useable
information while protecting civil liberties, and a directive to Congress to review performance of federal agencies.

3
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to combine and leverage relevant information regarding local events, such as an FSU/UF football
game in Gainesville, FL, with national intelligence analysis regarding similar events.
Our challenge is to determine how best to merge the capabilities of each type of
organization to create cooperative processes that not only meet the needs of local law
enforcement, but those of national intelligence agencies’ customer base. This study explores a
mechanism to integrate local law enforcement with the national intelligence initiatives. This is
broader than simply integrating the intelligence functions because the scope of data gathering
needs to be considered with respect to the scope of the analysis.
When dealing with terrorism, data is gathered locally, but needs to be analyzed globally
for it to make sense. Local law enforcement processes such as field investigative reporting, or
incident reporting, also need to be integrated with the national intelligence initiative. Integrating
only the local intelligence functions with the national intelligence functions would perform a
disservice to the entire intelligence community.
Justification of Importance of the Study
The research contained in this is significant, because its outcome could help guide specific local
implementations of information sharing to support the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. (U.S. Senate, 2004). It could also guide grant distribution to local law
enforcement, as it would provide some guidance to how to distribute grants to local agencies.
One of the key points in the bill establishes the National Counterterrorism Center 2 to coordinate

2

The National Counterterrorism Center is the primary United States organization to analyze and integrate
intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, it provides operational planning for counterterrorism
activities (diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security and law enforcement, ensures that agencies
have access to all-source intelligence, and ensures that agencies receive the intelligence needed to accomplish their
assigned jobs. It is allowed to disseminate information from any Federal, State, or Local agency, and can allow
authorized agencies to query Center data to assist in their assigned responsibilities. (White House, 2004)

4
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terrorism-related intelligence and conduct "strategic operational planning," which will include
the mission, objectives, tasks and interagency coordination. This center will require
unprecedented national information sharing in order to be effective. (White House, 2004).
Scope of the Study
To affirm, or falsify the propositions, the existing literature was reviewed. In addition, three
existing information sharing systems were reviewed: Alabama’s Law Enforcement Tactical
System Portal (LETS), Florida’s Statewide Data Sharing Effort (FINDER), and Orange County,
Florida’s Integrated Criminal Justice System (ICJIS). These programs served as case studies.
Limitations of the Study
As with any study, weaknesses exist that need to be acknowledged. Some limitations do exist in
this study.
•

This study is limited by the fact that knowledge about existing intelligence processes
was obtained from solely unclassified sources. It is possible that there are additional
relevant techniques or technologies in place today that are not considered in the scope
of this study because they are classified.

•

Minimal design documentation exists for the Alabama Law Enforcement Tactical
System Portal (LETS) or for the Florida Statewide Data Sharing Effort (FINDER).

•

The actual requirements for national intelligence information sharing are not known.
There is no known comprehensive approach to cross-agency intelligence collection
and analysis. Each independent agency seems focused on having its own ‘fusion’
center, each with its own sources of data. Without a comprehensive set of
requirements for the ‘enterprise’ needs for intelligence collection and analysis in
5
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today’s environment, and national directives encouraging their implementation, local
agencies will most likely continue to invest in systems that meet their local
operational and political objectives 3 .
Propositions
The key proposition in the study is that the Markle task force recommendations are sufficient to
achieve the required data integration in the United States. The Markle recommendations include:
•

The President should create Executive Orders to set up a decentralized informationsharing network.

•

The President should create a second Executive Order to govern the TTIC and
taskings.

•

DHS should coordinate efforts with state, local, and private sector entitites.

•

The FBI should share information with state and local law enforcement.

•

All agencies should create ways to produce more useable information while
protecting civil liberties.

•

Congress should review performance of federal agencies. (Markle, 2002)

3

The adoption of the UPC bar code serves as a useful analogy. In 1932, students at Harvard University proposed
that customers select catalog merchandise by removing punched cards from a catalog. In 1948, ink patterns were
proposed by a graduate student at Drexel University. Bar codes were not commercialized until 1966. There were
various locally successful vendor-specific barcodes created by Logicon, and then NCR corporation. Finally, the
“event that really got bar coding into industrial applications occurred September 1, 1981 when the United States
Department of Defense adopted the use of Code 39 for marking all products sold to the United States military.”
(Adams, 1995). Similarly, intelligence information sharing will reach its zenith when the national requirements
have been well-defined an implemented.

6
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Research Questions
1. Will the Markle recommendations be sufficient to support interconnection of regional and
state systems like Alabama LETS, Florida FINDER, and Orange County, Florida.
2. Are there aspects of Alabama LETS, Florida FINDER, and Orange County, Florida that are
not sufficient to accomplish the interoperability and therefore need to change?
3. What are possible insufficiencies in the Markle recommendations?
4. Are there any non-technical human barriers to system development and implementation?
Contents
The existing literature was examined the in areas of intelligence analysis, legislation, and
information sharing technology. It then describes the study methodology and presents the
analysis results of the three existing regional information sharing systems, and finally draws
conclusions for how to structure intelligence information sharing in the future.

7
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
This section of the study first describes what is meant by the term intelligence from
intelligence analysis, nature of the threat, and organizational change perspectives. It then
describes requirements for intelligence information sharing, relevant legislation, technology,
technical architecture solutions. Then the research questions are addressed by the literature
review.
Process: Intelligence
What does it mean to collect and share intelligence information within the United States?
In essence, intelligence involves gathering and analyzing data about who, what, where and when
someone is planning an attack of some kind. To do this, we must gather information about
people and organizations that have not yet violated the law. Simply gathering the information
does not make it intelligence, however, analyzing it does. In international security, there are
many different types of intelligence; including Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human
Intelligence (HUMINT), Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Imagery Intelligence
(IMINT), Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and open source information
(Clark 2004, p. 64). These are also called stovepipes in Intelligence Community jargon.
•

SIGINT – Includes communications, electronics and foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence

•

IMINT – Includes collection of images using devices such as lasers, radar, optics

•

HUMINT – Includes collection of intelligence collected by human sources

•

MASINT – Includes scientific and technical intelligence obtained by data collection

8
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•

Open Source Intelligence – data available to the public

The type of intelligence most appropriate to be shared between local law enforcement
and the international intelligence community is human intelligence (HUMINT). That is what is
discussed in this paper. It is also worthwhile to note that there are other local government
sources of data that may be valuable to share at a national level; such as parking ticket data
collected by parking enforcement bureau’s, text data on law enforcement’s incident reports. It is
also important that we define the routine low-level police records that are most important to feed
into the human intelligence process. Some of the requirements:
•

Local law enforcement needs to know when a known terrorist is in their vicinity.

•

International intelligence needs details of what a known terrorist is doing in a local
community and details of specific targets within the United States

•

Local resources may need to be tasked to look for anything involving certain targets
and weapons such as: explosives, infrastructure, biological materials, known
terrorists, suspected terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, or financial transactions

Intelligence information is critical to fighting terrorism, organized crime, and drug
trafficking enterprises. Accurate characterization of our terrorist adversary must drive
intelligence processes. “To design effective programs, allocate resources, and evaluate results,
policymakers need information about existing and impending trends in the illicit narcotics trade.”
(Kenney, 2003, p. 212) Having an information system, or network that supports the intelligence
creation activities is a critical success factor in combating the actions of any cell-based, or
distributed organization.

9
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Intelligence Analysis
We are undergoing a major overhaul of the way our intelligence community detects,
analyzes, and acts on threats to keep our society safe. Carter (2001, p. 7) describes the need to
deal with the problem of catastrophic terrorism. The focus of his article is on the “need to
reengineering the architecture of governance, security institutions and their modes of operation –
when war-scale damage results from terrorism.” Law enforcement, by nature, is programmed to
respond to incidents usually precipitated by 911 calls. Carter (2001, p. 8) states “the U.S. law
enforcement paradigm is also ill-suited to deal with catastrophic terrorism. This paradigm
centers on the post facto attribution of crimes to their perpetrators and to prosecution under the
law.” Business processes 4 within law enforcement have evolved over the years to support this
reactive paradigm. Once entrenched, the business processes become a culture. This culture of
reactivity makes it difficult, but not impossible, for uniformed patrol law enforcement to take a
more proactive role in intelligence gathering and analysis 5 . In one sense, they must change to be
able to work proactively, because we simply do not have enough data collection points to deal
with the detection of our highly creative enemy. Depending on the new business processes that

4

A business process is comprised of steps taken to achieve a business goal. It has inputs, ,methods, and outputs.
A person might ask if it is realistic for a patrol deputy on the street who is focused on a local domestic violence
incident to be concerned with gathering information for intelligence. It is important for the data the deputy needs to
gather on the street to be defined. For example, if language spoken, and citizenship are important fields to be
captured in an intelligence information sharing database, then the deputies should be required to enter that
information into their incident or arrest reporting system. The patrol deputy does not necessarily need to know that
that information is useful for terrorism-related intelligence analysis. This is analogous to a sales contact
management system. Many salespeople are trained to gather information such as gross sales, number of employees
when they make sales calls even though this information is not used by them specifically. Marketing analysts use
the information later to proactively plan the salespeople’s activities later.

5
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are created while reengineering our homeland security capabilities, a multitude of scenarios can
be created that the Markle Foundation proposal does not address 6 .
It is intelligence analysis that “organizes and interprets the intelligence (information) in a
way that significantly enhances its value and the possibility of its success in combating organized
crime. Analysis identifies and predicts trends, patterns or problem areas requiring action.”
(Carter, 2004, p. 57). For example, supposed that law enforcement patrol officers were trained to
report on suspicious persons near bridge structures in their field investigative report narratives.
Assume that the field investigative report data would be shared through the distributed
information network. Then suppose a tip came in that terrorists were going to target local bridge
structures in certain cities. An intelligence analyst could then query the shared information
network to see if there was a sudden increase in this number of incidents. The tip is used to
begin a deductive process whose result may be an inductive process of looking at related facts to
determine if there is a related pattern similar to the tip, or see if the tip is the beginning of real
activity.
“The fundamental point to draw from this discussion is that pieces of information
gathered through the collection process are not intelligence. Rather, intelligence is the

6

Consider a situation where an officer responds to a domestic violence incident and the suspect blurts out that
someone is plotting to blow-up the Daytona International Speedway during the next NASCAR™ race. The
officer would make the arrest and check a box on the charging affidavit that a potential terrorist statement was
made. The details of the statement could be documented on the charging affidavit and incident report. The
affidavit could then be sent electronically to a local “analyst.” The officer could also notify his sergeant who
then notifies a local “analyst”. The analyst would then formulate a hypothesis that there may be terrorists
planning activities against NASCAR races. The Local “analyst would search through shared databases to look
for other reports of similar activities/reports throughout the country to confirm the hypothesis. This “tasking”
could also be sent out to other regional analysts to perform similar analysis. A national intelligence “analyst”
could bring together the viewpoints of all of the regional “analysts”. If the data supported the hypothesis that
there are terrorists planning activities against NASCAR™ races, then national BOLO’s could be issued for race
.
stadiums
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knowledge derived from the logical integration and assessment of that information …” (Carter,
2004, p. 63). The entire intelligence cycle is reactive in nature. It is not initiated by observing
large collections of facts and observing patterns. Rather, a customer defines a requirement for
intelligence and the relevant agencies are subsequently tasked to create analytic products meeting
the requirements.

If a distributed information network exists, then an intelligence analyst can

hypothesize new ways that terrorists might attack us, then query the network to see if any
evidence supporting the hypothesized methods exists. For example, they might hypothesize that
a terrorist might use a crop duster to spray a chemical over a populated area, and look through
the network for incidents involving crop dusting, or airplane training incidents.
Tips may also drive inquiries into the distributed system to start an intelligence analysis
process. Suppose that an anonymous call comes into a 9/11 call center stating that Joe Bob is a
terrorist living in Orlando, Florida. The 9/11 center documents the anonymous call on an FIR.
A checkbox (new) on FIR indicates possible terrorist activity. The operator/detective routes the
information to the local “analyst.” Information about person, and location, and tactic is
documented in a local intelligence database. A local “analyst” determines the validity of the
claim and possibly dispatches a detective to investigate. If the information is deemed to be
‘qualified’, it is ‘shared’ with national intelligence database from the person, location, and tactic
(target-centric) perspectives. A national “analyst” may also be notified for further investigation.
The next time someone is looking for information on that person, location, or tactic, (either a
national or regional or local analyst), it will be there.
Another interesting point is that the performance of the tasks in the cycle is
compartmentalized. Collectors do not analyze. People who write intelligence requirements do

12
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not collect raw data. The cycle is organized along the same management principles as
organization of labor in a manufacturing plant for efficiency. (Carter, 2004).
When the FBI is involved, the intelligence cycle changes somewhat because the FBI has
the responsibility to integrate local law enforcement and national intelligence. Once the analytic
products have been created, they must be disseminated. The FBI disseminates information in
three standard products – FBI Intelligence Information Reports, Intelligence Bulletins, and
Intelligence Assessments. (Carter, 2004)
Clark (Clark, 2004) describes an intelligence cycle as well. The traditional intelligence
cycle includes requirements, planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.
Requirements define the intelligence problem to be solved. Planning determines how the
components of the cycle will solve the problem. Collection involves actually gathering the
information needed. Processing involves activities such as linguistics, translation, or signal
processing. Analysis requires human thought process to synthesize and make sense of the
gathered information, and to create an analysis product. Finally, dissemination involves sending
data to the original customer. (Clark, 2004 p. 15-16) “All intelligence involves creating a model
of the target and extracting knowledge from that model”. In a generic, iterative model described
by Clark, data is gathered and synthesized to create an initial model called “Model Version 1”.
Information is then added to this picture, synthesized again, to create another version of the
model, “Model Version 2”. The information in “Model Version 2” is then analyzed to begin to
create knowledge, and yet another version of the model emerges, called “Model Version 3” until
the product at the end is actionable intelligence. (Clark, 2004, p. 36).
Grabo’s book (Grabo, 2004) provides a detailed description of the specialized tasks
involved in the overall intelligence process, and of the difference in strategic and tactical
13
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warning. She does not overtly describe the traditional cycle, but rather, describes the steps
within it. Collected data, such as suspicious activity around likely targets documented in field
intelligence reports, or by certain individuals, leads to indications (information). Indications lead
to warning (analytic products) She describes warning intelligence, which is “to anticipate,
insofar as collection and analysis will permit, what potentially hostile entities are likely to do,
and particularly whether they are preparing to initiate adverse action”. (Grabo, 2004, p.1) One of
her key points is on the very human failing of not necessarily ‘accept’ what should be a logical
conclusion.
Different Views on Intelligence Analysis
One key difference between the Grabo (Grabo, 2004) and Clark (Clark, 2004)
perspectives is in the level of compartmentalization. In Grabo’s model, the task workers
function in their specialized area without benefit of an overarching reference model, other than
the requirements specified by the customer. In Clark’s model, there is an overarching reference
model that guides all activities through the cycle. Unsurprisingly, the approach described in
Grabo shows a work breakdown created using a manufacturing model of organization of work.
Each type of analyst is highly specialized. Indications analysts are different than order-of-battle
analysts. Clark on the other hand presents a ‘systems-approach’ to intelligence analysis. His
approach starts with a target goal to create a reference model is created, and information
synthesis/analysis are performed to refine the model. The difference between Grabo and Clark
can be described as bottom-up vs. top-down. Clark points this out, “An alternative to the
traditional cycle is to make all stakeholders (including customers) part of the intelligence
process….the cycle must be redefined, not for convenience of implementation in a traditional
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organizational hierarchy, but so that it can take full advantage of evolving information
technology and handle complex problems” (Clark, 2004, p. 17)
Another key difference is in the scope of the data collection, and of the analysis itself.
Local law enforcement intelligence analysis, even when performed as part of a metropolitan or
regional task force has access to limited sources of collected data. In many cases, the
information available from upstream (national) sources is in the form of analytic products.
Local law enforcement intelligence analysis efforts also include community outreach efforts that
help educate local communities as to the actions, behaviors and events that constitute
‘suspicions’ from a terrorism perspective. (Clark, 2004)

Today’s Context: The Character of our Adversary
During the Cold War, our adversaries were conventional in nature. Harris (2002, p. 4)
describes them as hierarchical, formal, with concentrated leadership, centralized command and
control, with formal budgeting processes. Our post Cold-War adversary has an entirely different
shape. Threats to national security in early 2001 increasingly dealt with threats such as terrorist
organizations, organized criminal networks, or drug trafficking. In early 2001, the Central
Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence conducted a review to determine future needs
for intelligence products and create a vision for the optimal structure for the United States
Intelligence Community (IC). The IC realized that they needed to redefine the skills and
information that intelligence analysts needed to do their jobs. They also realized that they needed
to find better ways to synthesize their secret information with more open sources of information
to create actionable intelligence. (Lahneman, 2003, p. 573).
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The events of September 11, 2001 increased the urgency of these efforts. Harris (2002,
p. 1) states “the terrorism we face is decentralized, self-generating and is tied to the existence of
failed states and the battle for the soul of Islam.”
These events also led to the creation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, (9-11 Commission, 2004) which most people know as the 9-11
Commission. Their web site provides the details of the 9-11 Commission’s composition,
activities and reports. It describes that this commission was an “an independent, bipartisan
commission created by congressional legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush
in late 2002”. It was “chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances
surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the
immediate response to the attacks.” The Commission is also mandated to provide
recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.” (9-11 Commission Web Site, 2004)

Organizational Change
There appears to be some lack of clarity at the Federal level as to how to architect the
overall intelligence information sharing initiative. The Markle foundation recommended a
completely distributed approach to sharing data. The near-term approach, the SHARE network,
assumes that the information that is available to be shared is will be useful information needed
for information sharing. The Markle recommendations also state that agencies should create
ways to produce more useable information while protecting civil liberties (Markle, 2003) It also
assumes that the existing processes for intelligence collection and analysis are the right ones, as
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the recommendations do not include any consideration for process change. In fact, there has not
yet been an analysis performed that leads to this conclusion.
There are significant challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security today.
According to the RAND Corporation testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs in the United States Senate, “the first challenge is the lack of robust
strategic planning and analysis capability in the Department.” (Wermouth, 2005, p. 2) Without
a strategic planning capability, it is not likely that an overall strategy for intelligence collection
and analysis will be developed.
Deborah G. Barger is a senior intelligence officer who is interested in the topic of change
in the U.S. Intelligence Community. More specifically, she believes that what is needed is a
Revolution in Intelligence Affairs (RIA). “There is both a need and an opportunity for the
Intelligence Community to change in ways that would change its form and function well beyond
what is currently contemplated, let alone imagined, by the various proponents of reform.”
(Barger, 2005, p. 2). An RIA does not focus on organizational structure; rather, it establishes a
process for continual reinvention. Ms. Barger states, “so much has changed in the geopolitical,
social, and technological backdrop for the intelligence mission that few of the old assumptions –
about why we have an intelligence apparatus, what its missions are, and what capabilities give
U.S. intelligence a dominant advantage over its adversaries – apply.” (Barger, 2005, p.8)
Barger points out that a fundamental shift has occurred. Nation-states are no longer our
primary concern. Instead, we now have a large potential for weapons of mass destruction to be
in the hands of small disaffected groups such as criminal enterprises, domestic terrorists, foreign
terrorists). Another concern she raises is that the Intelligence Community “may be locked into
outmoded technologies, collection operations, and analytical methodologies when new and
17
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possibly better ways of developing knowledge are available.” (Barger, 2005, p. 19)

Most

importantly, she talks about the fact that the distinction between collection and analysis has been
called into question by the distinction between information and intelligence created by the
information age. Based on this line of thinking, it may be possible to create an environment that
transcends the rigid organizational structures and processes of the intelligence community
through effective creation of intelligence information sharing systems.
Structure: Intelligence and Law Enforcement Organizational Structures
Our intelligence structures and processes are one step behind our adversary. Harris
(2002, p. 5) states, “The United States is comfortable fighting adversaries that are similar to itself
and is equally comfortable collecting intelligence against such adversaries.” The following
highly simplified diagram illustrates the disparities in the organizational structures of the
adversaries. Note that while the CIA and Defense Intelligence groups are omitted from the
diagram, they are still considered part of the overall intelligence community being discussed.
Defense Organization

Terrorist Organization
TTIC
Cell

FBI

Local
Police
Cell

Figure 1 – United States Intelligence Hierarchy vs. Cell-based Terrorist organization
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In figure 1, the FBI is shown as a hierarchical organization using solid black circles on
the diagram. The FBI is currently reorganizing so that transmission of intelligence information
up the chain of command to the central organization consolidates counterterrorism information to
the Terrorist Threat Information Center (TTIC). If the FBI deems information relevant it is then
disseminated from there to other organizations performing intelligence analysis such as the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The TTIC, in turn, receives intelligence information from
many other organizations.
The FBI’s key mechanism for sharing information with local law enforcement is the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which is comprised of FBI, local agencies, and other federal
agencies. The purpose of a JTTF is to share information regarding terrorist activities.
Sometimes the JTTF members frequently are not allowed to share information back to their
originating agency without permission of their JTTF leader. This in some ways defeats the
information sharing purpose of the JTTF. (DeRosa & Lewis, 2004, p. 2).
Compare that to the activities of the terrorist cells shown as solid black circles on the
right-hand side of the diagram. More flexibly run, the cells can be combined to participate in
terrorist acts anywhere. They have no such restrictions on who they can work with, and are
brought together, or come together in combinations to achieve their goals. “With grassroots
origins, the adversary will morph and adapt, regroup, generate new leadership, shift geographic
locus, adjust tactics, and evolve into a collection of cells and networks different from the ones we
have engaged fairly successfully since September 11. “ (Harris, 2002, p. 1)
The question we need to answer is how we make information available to people
investigating terrorist activity regardless of which agency they work for. Also, how do we make
the information available in a timely manner to actually proactively detect and prevent an event?
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It is easy to blame terrorist successes on lack of information sharing between intelligence
and defense agencies, but the overall problem is also a structural and process problem. The
intelligence community has not yet adapted to the new shape of the adversary. In addition,
oversimplified approaches to information sharing and enterprise architecture rarely yield the
desired results of improved operational performance.
This section describes the errors with applying the Markle Foundations’ proposal to all
types of problems. Baird and Barksdale (2004, ¶ 1) specifically state that “While the discussion
over how to implement the 9/11Commission’s recommendations to restructure the intelligence
community is important, another key commission recommendation, creating a “trusted
information network” to facilitate better information sharing among our intelligence agencies,
needs immediate attention. Implementing such a network would make America safer today.”
The information-sharing network is a necessary, but not sufficient solution to the overall goal of
increased public safety through better intelligence about terrorist networks. Within this context,
implementation of sharing limited data sets using their proposal (e.g. watch lists) could not harm
anything, and would prove beneficial.
Requirements
In developing the requirements for a national law enforcement data sharing initiative,
viewpoints from three intelligence authors were used to provide a framework to combine local
intelligence initiatives with national intelligence initiatives.
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Law Enforcement Intelligence (Carter)
Law enforcement intelligence is primarily focused on multi-jurisdictional illegal
activities such as “Commodity flow, trafficking, and transiting logistics”. Law enforcement
intelligence focuses on “Who poses threats”, “who is doing what with whom?”, “What is the
modus operandi of the threat?”, “What is needed to catch offenders and prevent crime incidents
or trends?” (Carter, 2004, p. 43)
In some law enforcement agencies, field interview reports are managed by an intelligence
unit, while in others, they are simply entered into databases, or onto paper forms by uniformed
patrol officers. If you look at a traditional law enforcement intelligence operation that is
focused on local or regional crime control, it is sufficient for a law enforcement intelligence
analyst to be narrowly focused on the law enforcement reports in the context of the related
activities in the geographic region. However, in a terrorist-related situation, the actors may be
widely dispersed by time, location, or activity, so the scope of the data being analyzed needs to
be far different than that produced by the law enforcement agency alone. It is necessary, but not
sufficient for a law enforcement analyst to be able to review analytic products created by other
law enforcement analysts and federal intelligence analysts. In order for the analyst to draw the
right conclusions and ‘connect the dots’, he needs to have access to similar information in other
jurisdictions without it being subjected to pre filtering or analysis 7 . This data, such as the
narrative information on FIR cards, or other data such as incident reports at particular target

7

It is also worth noting that the process of “connecting the dots” is most effective when it starts with a trigger, or tip
about a specific target (person, place, tactic). Starting with the trigger, data in a shared information system can then
be queried by deduction, with query results either proving or disproving an analytical hypothesis. The sparse nature
of raw data in the case of terrorism limits the appropriateness of an inductive approach where tools evaluate the data
and predictions are output.
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locations, would need to be made available in an unclassified form that does not reveal sources
or methods.

Analysis for Strategic Warning (Grabo)
Grabo’s (Grabo, 2004) describes the overall intelligence process, and it also points out
some very human problems associated with intelligence analysis such as our inability to see
threats with low probability but potential great danger, inadequate collection against this
category of threats, communication breakdown between collectors, analysts and agencies, not
listening to the minority opinion, and the processes overall susceptibility to deception. (Grabo,
2004, p. ix)

Intelligence Analysis: A target-centric approach (Clark)
The first step in any analysis is determining the target or objective of the analysis. Clark
discusses the use of models, or “a replica, or representation, of an idea, an object, or an actual
system. The model forms the end-goal for the intelligence analysis. This goal provides the
requirements within which to structure the overall combined intelligence sharing initiative.
(Clark, 2004)

Integration of Local Law Enforcement Intelligence with National Intelligence
In integrating local law enforcement intelligence and activities with national intelligence
directed towards terrorism, an overall model, as Clark (Clark, 2004) suggests, needs to be built.
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This monitor would be built using both person information, and field investigative report
information. It could also include analytical end-products. The data facts, combined with the
history of queries by investigators and analysts would be used to build a big-picture for decision
makers. Rather than having intelligence analysts create individual analytical products that are
subsequently shared with other agencies up the chain of command or laterally, the entire raw
data database would be made available to the intelligence analysts throughout the analytical
network, with protections on individual sources and methods built into the database. This
database would include not only information about persons and activities, but also information
about vehicles, and property information. 8 The processes that connect local law enforcement to
national intelligence agencies are also important.
Consider this example; a person is stopped by a law enforcement officer for speeding.
The officer observes bomb-making materials in the car. The officer writes a traffic ticket, and
also a charging affidavit that documents the presence of bomb-making materials. He arrests the
person. On the charging affidavit, the officer checks the “terrorist” checkbox and notifies his
Sergeant. The Sergeant notifies a local “analyst”. The Information about person, and location,
and tactic is documented in a local intelligence database. The local “analyst” determines validity
of claim and possibly dispatches a detective to investigate and qualify the data. If the
information is deemed to be ‘qualified’, it is ‘shared’ with national intelligence database from the
person, location, and tactic (target-centric) perspectives. There may also be other task forces
that deal with domestic terrorists that need to be notified. The next time someone is looking for

8

This is likely to be a significant quantity of data. For example, the FINDER system has 300,000 queries from
January – June of 2005. FINDER currently includes participation from 90 agencies. Performance analysis of this
quantity of data in a distributed system is not within the scope of this thesis.
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information on that person, location, or tactic, (either a national or regional or local analyst), it
will be there.

Legislation
This section focuses on legislation that impacts intelligence information sharing
initiatives. It describes aspects of the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
and the REAL ID Act. (Real ID Act, U.S. House. 2005. H.R. 418)

Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
The 9-11 Commission produced a widely distributed final report, entitled Final Report of
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission, 2004).
Contained within this is an endorsement of a proposal by the Markle Foundation for the creation
of the Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security. The Commission recommendations
include “unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a
network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional government boundaries.”
(9-11 Commission , 2004, p. 400). Title II of the 9-11 Implementation Act (Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, U.S. Senate. 2004. s.1016) authorizes creation of the
trusted information network, and creation of incentives for inter-agency information sharing.
(U.S. Senate, 2004, p. 5) Since the act was just implemented, its direct implications have yet to
be realized. Fortunately, Florida’s Data Sharing (FDSS) model, a working example of the
Markle Foundations’ network architecture provides us with a possible outcome of the
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capabilities of the proposal. “In the past, police investigating burglaries spent countless hours
calling around to find out if stolen property had been pawned. Now they just enter a description
of either the property or the suspect’s name in the FDSS and see if there’s a match.” (Solomon,
2004, p. 23)

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, U.S. Senate. 2004. s.1016) provides
for the President to create an “information sharing environment” (ISE) to facilitate the sharing of
terrorism information. This approach may include any methods determined necessary and
appropriate for carrying out this section. This section also provides for staged development and
reporting. “The President shall, to the greatest extent practicable, ensure that the ISE provides
the functional equivalent of, or otherwise supports, a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated
environment that (A) connects existing systems, where appropriate, provides no single points of
failure, and allows users to share information among agencies, between levels of government,
and as appropriate, with the private sector” (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, U.S. Senate. 2004. s.1016) Other key concepts include “establishing an initial capability to
provide electronic directory services, or the functional equivalent, to assist in locating in the
Federal Government intelligence and terrorism information and people with relevant knowledge
about intelligence and terrorism information” (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, U.S. Senate. 2004. s.1016)
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The Act should facilitate at least initial efforts towards a nationally integrated intelligence
system that serves local, state, and federal law enforcement and intelligence. A method that
eases agencies into the concept of information sharing, by promising to allow them to ‘keep their
existing systems’ has the advantage of lowering each agencies’ resistance to change 9 . This is
most effective for sharing automated information with ‘like’ data elements such as the terrorism
watch lists, or perhaps some of the ‘indicators’ per Grabo’s (Grabo, 2004) Carter’s (Carter,
2004) guide is focused on law-enforcement, so it’s likely that the bill will facilitate this type of
information sharing (horizontal: connection between similar agencies).
The bigger barrier to information sharing remains the cultural problems with the concept
of information sharing in general and agencies’ reluctance to change. Law enforcement agencies
main focus for technology is to automate their paper records. “A significant number of local
law enforcement agencies still submit and maintain records on paper, rather than using an
electronic format” (Vest, 2005). The bill in effect reinforces this reluctance to share, by
‘integrating existing systems’. While this is a necessary starting point, and in fact, putting
broader language in the legislation would probably stop integration efforts completely, the
cultural issue does still need to be addressed at some point for maximum information sharing
benefit that supports a target-centric approach. As we move towards a target centric intelligence
model as described by Clark (Clark, 2004) the requirements for intelligence information sharing
become more process-oriented. As the process integration becomes more important than raw
data sharing, the importance of evaluating individual agency business processes in addition to

9

It is reasonable for agencies to keep their own systems to meet their individual operational objectives, while
modifying those systems to promote information sharing. “Your organization's decision-making capabilities will be
turbo-charged with consistent data, rather than diverting inordinate attention to data inconsistencies and
reconciliations” (Ross, 2002, p. 2)
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arms-length XML-style data sharing becomes more important. The bill does contain language
to keep tighter business process and systems integration options open, “connects existing
systems, where appropriate” (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, U.S.
Senate. 2004. s.1016) so this again facilitates information sharing.

H.R. 418 (Introduced 1/26/2005) Real ID Act of 2005
The problem of person identification is quite significant in the context of integrated
intelligence information sharing, as it is in general justice system information sharing initiative.
Without a way to uniquely identify a person in each system that is standard across systems,
multiple fields, such as name, race, and date of birth will need to be used to connect the data in
the disparate databases. In most contemporary databases, this type of data can be unreliable
because of data entry errors, or simply because it is not known. Common problems related to
person data include; names being recorded in different forms such as with middle initial, or no
middle initial, a person may legitimately be known by multiple names, and the scope for error in
data entry when personal information is first recorded. (PIU, 2002,71)
On January 26, 2005, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
and 115 cosponsors introduced the REAL ID Act (Real ID Act, 2005) . “In December, House
Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) reluctantly agreed to shelve
important immigration reform provisions of last year’s homeland security legislation so that vital
intelligence reforms could be enacted as quickly as possible.” (Federation, 2005, ¶1) This act
strengthens some of the provisions related to driver’s license loopholes in the states, without
taking the person identification as far as a national identification card. Current efforts to
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implement a national identification card are being blocked by special interest groups such as the
ACLU. “For this reason, we would urge, in the strongest terms, that you jettison the
controversial national ID card provisions in H.R. 10 (embodied in sections 3052 and 3053 of the
House bill), and Subtitle B of S. 2845. …These sections would give federal bureaucrats the
regulatory authority to determine who can and cannot get a driver’s license or state-issued photo
ID” (ACLU,2004, ¶3-4)
The next section of this document describes some of the technology-related background
for this thesis.
Technology
Technologies are needed to support process automation, however, they need to be
implemented in such a way that they support overall enterprise goals. This section describes
some of the recent issues that have plagued federal information system development, possible
blueprints for information sharing, and technical architecture 10 solutions.

Federal Information Systems
Enterprise information architecture is a nontrivial problem. Congressional auditors
recently told the Department of Defense that it “isn’t doing enough to implement its information
architecture.” (Chabrow, 2004, ¶ 1) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is in the midst
of creating overall consolidated information architecture. “DHS still is struggling to merge
terrorist watch lists” (Miller, 2004, p. 44) The FBI has also been criticized for its inability to use

10

Here, technical architecture is used to refer to various ways that information technology professionals might create
a solution to implement an information sharing initiative using various low-level techniques.
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technology. “A December report by Justice Department Inspector General Glenn Fine
particularly criticized the bureau’s inability to utilize technology to combat terrorism.” (as cited
in Clark, 2003, ¶ 4)
The IC comprised of the CIA and Defense Department knew it had issues with translating
facts into analysis. Travers (1997, ¶ 1) wrote a haunting prediction:
The year is 2001. The Intelligence Community (IC) budget has remained under pressure
and manpower cuts have continued, but bureaucratic politics and legislative prerogatives have
perpetuated about a dozen national-level agencies and forced a further division of analytic
labor. By the turn of the century, analysis had become dangerously fragmented. The Community
could still collect "facts," but analysts had long ago been overwhelmed by the volume of
available information and were no longer able to distinguish consistently between significant
facts and background noise. The quality of analysis had become increasingly suspect. And, as
had been true of virtually all previous intelligence failures, collection was not the issue. The data
were there, but we had failed to recognize fully their significance and put them in context. At a
time when the interrelationship among political, economic, military, social, and cultural factors
had become increasingly complex, no agency was postured to conduct truly integrated analysis.
From the vantage point of 2001, intelligence failure is inevitable.
On September 11, 2001, the prediction became undeniably true, and the clamor for better
information sharing between intelligence agencies began.

Blueprints for Information Sharing
All computer-based information sharing systems follow an overall pattern, or blueprint either by
design or by accident. These blueprints are frequently called “application architecture” in the
Information Technology (IT) industry. Application architecture is analogous to mass
transportation design. A subway that requires that all riders travel to a central hub to change
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trains to go to another line is a centralized transportation system. A subway that provides a
circular route around a city that intersects the spokes of the system that go downtown may be
considered more flexible from a rider’s perspective. The design of information sharing systems
follows similar patterns, even though all but the most technical observers don’t know the patterns
are there. Since these patterns form the building blocks for the design of overall intelligence
information sharing systems, this section describes the various blueprints, or “application
architectures” that may be used to construct an overall system.
Most articles about information sharing in the criminal justice area focus on two basic
conceptual application architecture models for information sharing; vertical and horizontal.
“The exchange of information between two or more agencies is known as inter-agency or
business-to-business integration. There are generally two types of integration, vertical and
horizontal.” (IJIS Institute, 2004, p. 1) In reality, there are more types of conceptual information
sharing models that are relevant to intelligence and criminal justice information sharing. Each
conceptual model can, in turn, be implemented using a variety of technology architectures. This
section describes each conceptual model in turn, then puts the Markle recommendation into this
context.
Vertical Integration
Vertical integration, as used in this document, refers to the sharing of data and
information between dissimilar agencies, such as a Sheriff’s office and a State Attorney’s office
within a single geographic jurisdiction. The term ‘upward’ is used to describe it as information
is shared from the bottom of the triangle below to the top. What ties vertical integration
together is business process flow both up and down the model as shown in Figure 2 below. In
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the Orange County, Florida integrated criminal justice system project, arrest data is captured
wirelessly in law enforcement’s mobile data computers. The arrest data is then shared up the
model to the Clerk of Court, who assigns and shares a court case number for that arrest. The
aggregate data is then shared with the prosecutor, corrections, and other justice agencies. So, the
actual pattern of information sharing is not strictly vertical in one direction, but rather, flows
both up and down the model vertically.

PUBLIC

Vertical
COURTS

PROSECUTORS

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Horizontal Integration
Figure 2 – Traditional Horizontal vs. Vertical Model

31

7/22/2005

Advantages
This model for information sharing can cause the agencies participating in the
information sharing initiative to examine their business processes to make sure they make sense
in the context of other agencies processes. For example, in Orange County, criminal traffic
charges and felony/misdemeanor charges were typically documented on two separate charging
affidavits. The ICJIS steering committee realized that with the data flow in ICJIS, this was
causing extra court cases to be created. The Sheriff’s office proposed that criminal traffic
charges be combined with the felony/misdemeanor charges on a single charging affidavit and the
ICJIS Business Committee brought the proposal forward to the various agencies. Although this
caused manual process changes in the Clerk of Courts, and it caused felony/misdemeanor judges
to agree to hear criminal traffic charges, the group of agencies realized that the savings of several
thousand court cases per year was worth the process change effort. Similarly, when the group
realized that making citizenship a field on a charging affidavit would enable more efficient
consulate notification when a foreign national was arrested, they changed the charging affidavit
to include the field. Consulate notification can now be triggered automatically, instead of
through having Corrections personnel manually inspect each charging affidavit that comes into
the jail. Kemp (personal communication, June 25, 2005)
The benefit of business process examination is that it can eliminate processes that are
being done, “because we always did it that way,” thus streamlining the performance of the
overall organization. It also enables cross-agency process automation and the creation of an
overall enterprise process for whatever the information sharing objective is. Finally, it exposes
deficiencies in information systems that need to be improved in order for individual agency
objectives to be met. When a system comprised of processes and technology has been in place
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for a long time, the people in the system typically compensate for the deficiencies in the
technology. The Orange County ICJIS project has identified many instances of this occurring,
and is in the process of improving the system integrations to eliminate the need for
compensation. For example, in the late 1990’s in Orange County, electronic automated
fingerprint identification replaced inking and manual classification of fingerprints. This had the
unintended side-effect of causing the Offender-Based Transaction Number (OBTS), which had
been provided as a sequential sticker by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, to be
generated by the AFIS machine. After automation, there was no way for the OBTS number to be
affixed to the paper copy of the charging affidavit that flowed through the system. This meant
that the agencies that had formerly relied on this number no longer had access to it. The
Corrections department had a requirement to use the OBTS number when they transferred an
inmate from their jail to another County. The other County requires the OBTS number in order
that the reporting to FDLE is done correctly. The Corrections department invented a manual
process of calling the Sheriff’s Record’s Identification Section on the telephone and having them
look up the booking in a system called the NIST archive that stores index data to the fingerprints
for prior arrests. These are examples of longstanding deficiencies that need to be fixed in order
to automate cross-agency processes. Kemp (personal communication, June 25, 2005)

Disadvantages
Vertical integration is not a quick fix. It requires strong commitment by each
participant’s leadership, and the patience to thoroughly perform the business analysis. In
addition, it requires development of an overall enterprise goal for information sharing. In many
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organizations, getting buy-in politically or organizationally to an overall goal is very difficult to
do. In the context of the national intelligence information sharing effort, this may seem
impossible to do because of the number of agencies involved and the differing cultures. In fact,
it may not be impossible. If an approach is taken that limits the scope of the goal, and
information being shared, then it will be possible. For example, if it is determined that having
access to narratives on incident reports and FIR cards will provide information useful to
intelligence analysts, then the national information sharing initiative could focus solely on
sharing that information. Implementation would focus only on that data being shared. In effect,
the FINDER system provides the basic infrastructure to enable dissemination of this specific
information. FINDER could be expanded to include the additional fields needed per the limited
national goal.
Horizontal Integration
Horizontal integration, as used in this document, refers to the sharing of information
between agencies in different geographic jurisdictions with similar missions and objectives. For
example, the Florida FINDER project shares data horizontally between law enforcement
agencies in Florida, “Many major law enforcement agencies in the Central Florida area have
expressed a determination to engineer and deploy effective data sharing architectures. In
partnership with the University of Central Florida (UCF), these police organizations have joined
in an effort to build an economical system for exchanging information. The initial effort to
deploy an efficient data sharing capability will focus on tracking pawned property transactions.
This project will be followed by the development of an integrated Field Interrogation Card (FI)
capacity.” (UCF, 2002 , p. 1) In addition, FINDER sees vertical integration to non-similar
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agencies that are different classes: local police, state police, federal police. Reynolds. (personal
communication, June 28, 2005)

Orange
County
Sheriff

Polk
County
Sheriff

Seminole
County
Sheriff

Figure 3 – Horizontal Information Sharing Between Similar Agencies

Advantages
There are some business advantages to this type of information sharing initiative,
particularly in a political situation where agencies are not ready to relinquish control of their
data. In the national information sharing arena, this will be a significant factor. These include
the ability to maintain 100% control over their own data and determine what to share, minimal
changes to their core systems are needed. Sometimes this solution is advertised as needing no
changes to a system, which may or may not actually be the case.

Disadvantages
One of the disadvantages of this approach is that it does not support consolidated
reporting particularly well. As the number of participating systems increases, and the desire to
query data across agencies increases, the performance of the system overall could suffer. In
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addition, something to be aware of is that semantic differences in data can yield unexpected
results 11 . The more the data being queried has its format legislated or standardized, the more
consistent query results will be. Each system being queried needs to have similar meanings to
the data being queried. For example, a ‘name’ needs to mean the same thing across the systems.
The Global Justice XML Schema is an attempt to standardize semantics of data definitions
nationally. “The Global Justice XML Data Model (Global JXDM) is intended to be a data
reference model for the exchange of information within the justice and public safety
communities. The Global JXDM is a product of the Global Justice Information Sharing
Initiative's (Global) Infrastructure and Standards Working Group (ISWG). It was developed by
the Global ISWG's XML Structure Task Force (XSTF).” (USDOJ, 2004, p. 1)
Centralization to Support Reporting / Data Warehousing
Another type of integration is centralization of data. This is in essence, reporting
facilitated by combining of data from local agencies to regional, state or federal agency.
Centralization could also be performed by combining data to a regional server. Some agencies
also call this “vertical information sharing between agencies at the local, state, and federal level.”
(Pinal County, 2003, p. 1), however, it is distinct from the previously discussed vertical
integration. In the criminal justice system, the most familiar form of reporting to a central
database is the FBI’s uniform Crime reporting statistics. Other areas where this type of
consolidation is common is in reporting of local agency data to state agencies, such as the
reporting of circuit court data to a state court association. For example, the Clerk of Courts in

11

The Global Justice XML Data Model is intended to reduce semantic differences. As the third-party vendors that
build the systems that support their operations start using the model, the semantic differences will be reduced.
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Florida report their data to the Florida Association of State Clerks’ Comprehensive Case
Information System (FACC, 2003). Other jurisdictions may choose to share information via
other centralized approaches such as a consolidated database approach where all agencies choose
to share a centralized database.

Advantages
Centralizing data has major performance advantages. Database technology has the
capability to efficiently access centralized data. In contrast, a solution that requires querying the
distributed databases must perform queries individually to each system, and combine the data in
real time in memory.

Disadvantages
The centralized data is a replication of data stored in detail at other locations. If the
databases at the locations being centralized changes, it may not immediately be recognized in the
centralized reporting database. A centralization strategy for multiple agency databases can
cause lack of attention on consistency issues. Ross (2003) states “Vendors promote
centralization as a miracle elixir to treat data warehouse ailments. They claim it spins
independent, disparate data marts into gold by reducing administrative costs and improving
performance. Physical centralization may deliver some efficiencies; however, you can't afford to
bypass the larger, more important issues of integration and consistency.”
Data warehousing has political and legal implications. Data warehousing involves
copying data from its source location to a shared location for reporting. Many agencies are
reluctant to let ‘copies’ of their data out to a location that is not within their control.
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Business Intelligence or Portal Solution
Business Intelligence, or a portal solution, is not necessarily a true integration from a data
or process perspective; it provides a unified user-level view for the information consumer across
data from multiple systems 12 . The view may pull information from agency systems that would
fall into a horizontal category (e.g. all law enforcement), or they may be from agencies that that
fall into a vertical category, or from a combination of the two. Behind the scenes, other
integration strategies may need to be used to structure the data so that it can be displayed. An
example of this type of solution is the government gateway at http://www.gateway.gov.uk/.
“The government portal, part of Blair's new e-government initiative of having 100 percent of
government transactions online by 2005, is designed to connect the 200 central and 482 local
government institutions with the United Kingdom's 60 million citizens and 3 million businesses.”
(Microsoft, 2001, ¶4)

Advantages
This approach can yield results very quickly, that will make decision-making in the shortterm. In some cases, it also requires minimal changes to existing systems. Another advantage is
that it can eliminate the need to replicate data into a reporting database. Replication has the
potential to introduce errors if the data is not synchronized or replicated properly. (Ross, 1999,
¶7) states “centralization without data integration and semantic consistency will distract an
organization from focusing on the real crux of the problem. Inconsistent data will continue to
flummox the organization's decision-making ability.”
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Disadvantages
This approach requires that the data in the systems being viewed has a way to ‘connect’
it. For example, a person identifier in one of the systems needs to be replicated in the other.
This can be problematic. For example, if a Department of Corrections system used a
“Department of Corrections DC#” to uniquely identify a person, but a law enforcement record
management system used a “state identification number” or “FBI number” to identify a person,
and neither system had the others number in it as a cross-reference, then the two systems could
not be pulled together for display in a business intelligence system.
Combination Conceptual Models
It is a mistake in any large-scale integrated systems solution to assume that a single
conceptual model will meet all the requirements of a particular information sharing initiative. In
particular, with respect to Intelligence Information Sharing, combination of the models can yield
the best solution overall. Stonebraker (2004) describes how combined enterprise application
integration models are necessary to meet enterprise integration objectives.
As figure 2 on page 35 illustrates, the different integration models can be combined to
meet different integration goals. In this system, FINDER is the horizontal integration solution
linking law enforcement. Within Orange County, Florida, the ICJIS solution is what is
responsible for coordinating positive biometric identification of individuals and tying that to
specific arrest documents. The ICJIS hub communicates with other agencies’ systems to build

12

A related topic is a federated database in which multiple databases on disparate systems are made to look like a
single database. It is technically different from a portal, or business intelligence solution because the integration is
done at the data layer, not at the user interface or business layer.
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up its internal indices. The Judicial Dashboard, a business intelligence/portal solution takes
advantage of a global person index and a case index in the Orange County, ICJIS hub.
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Figure 4 – Combining Integration Models in an Overall System.
In Figure 5, a similar combination is shown that shows how horizontally integrated
systems can be combined to provide support for intelligence fusion centers. Essentially,
regional information sharing systems are created using horizontal information sharing
techniques. An intelligence hub, using predefined business processes for information sharing, is
capable of pulling data from each regional information sharing system and routing it to one or
more fusion centers based on subscription. The hub would have the capability to route
information with different classification levels to the appropriate fusion center. The hub would
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also take as input analyses prepared by the various agencies involved in national intelligence and
route that to the fusion centers. The fusion centers themselves would have consolidated
databases that are continually updated with information throughout the day. Other algorithms
such as a ‘terrorist threat network monitor’ or the Atypical Signal Analysis and Processing
(ASAP) 13 method (Hollywood, 2004) would be built to leverage the consolidated databases and
the subscription feature of the INTEL hub.
Other agencies that play a role in gathering and analyzing intelligence would also
participate in the hub, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Marshalls, the Department of Homeland Security, and private agencies.
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13

The Atypical Signal Analysis and Processing (ASAP) method is a method proposed by RAND corporation
researchers to solve the problem of “connecting the dots” in Intelligence. It is targeted at solving the problem of
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Figure 5 – Combining Integration Models to Support Intelligence Fusion Centers
The Federal Government System Solution: The Markle Recommendation
The Markle Foundation recommended a single, distributed architecture to solve all types
of information sharing requirements identified in the 9-11 commission report. (Exhibit A, Page
1, of Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security , December 2004, Markle
Taskforce on National Security in the Information Age):

monitoring “large and disparate data streams looking for uncertain and unclear indicators that, taken together,
represent potential risks.” (Hollywood, 2004, p. iii)
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The President Should issue an Executive Order that does the following:
1. Sets the goal of creating a decentralized network along the lines set out in this report.
2. Sets forth specific and clear objectives for improved analysis and information sharing,
which each federal agency should be required to meet by December 31, 2004.
3. Establishes guidelines for agencies’ collection, use, and dissemination of information,
including private sector information.
4. Establishes a process for Executive Branch review of agencies’ performance in
improving analysis, information sharing, and utilization of private sector information,
to take place after December 31, 2004.
5. Designates the DHS as the lead agency of an interagency, public-private process to
establish the concept of operations for the network, directs other agencies to offer their
full assistance and cooperation, and establishes a timeframe for implementation.
6. Clarifies the respective roles of the DHS, the TTIC, and other federal agencies in
information sharing and analysis.

The President should also issue a second Executive Order or other
directive that does the following:
7. Establishes guidelines governing the authority of the TTIC and other intelligence,
defense, and security agencies to receive, retain, and disseminate information gathered
in the U.S. about U.S. persons.
8. Establishes guidelines governing intelligence agencies’ ability to set requirements for
(or “task”) domestic collection of information.
9. Creates within the TTIC appropriate institutional mechanisms to safeguard privacy and
other civil liberties.
10. The contents of the Executive Order should be unclassified to the maximum extent
possible and put out for notice and comment. In addition, the President should
consider introducing legislation to codify the appropriate scope of the TTIC’s use and
dissemination of information about U.S. persons.
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The DHS should do the following:
1. Convene an interagency, public-private group to design a strategy and concept of
operations for the decentralized network we describe, which should render a working
plan within a year.
2. Work with state, local, and private sector entities to create decentralized analytical
centers, foster their ability to communicate with other players in the network, and
establish standards for digitization, retention, and communication of information
3. Establish clear mechanisms for responding to requests for threat and vulnerability
information from local officials
4. Establish a process for ensuring that as much information as possible is being shared
among network entities, including a dispute resolution mechanism to resolve
disagreements among agencies about how much information can be shared
5. Establish a process for overseeing federal agency development and implementation of
guidelines governing the acquisition, use, retention, and dissemination of private sector
information and the creation of methods for ensuring oversight and accountability
6. Work with state, local, and private sector entities to institute information-sharing and
analysis objectives for these entities, and establish a process with them for jointly
evaluating their performance after December 31, 2004, and thereafter on an ongoing
basis.

The FBI should do the following:
1. Establish mechanisms for sharing information with state and local law enforcement
agencies and for encouraging those agencies to share directly with other players in the
network
2. Establish clear mechanisms for responding to requests for threat and vulnerability
information from local officials.

All government agencies with homeland security intelligence
responsibilities should do the following:
1. Set up mechanisms to produce more information that can readily be disseminated to
other players in the network, including unclassified information.
2. Identify specific categories of private sector information they need, using a scenariodriven process that considers the types of situations they might confront in
investigating or seeking to uncover terrorist activity.
3. Institute guidelines governing the acquisition, use, retention, and dissemination of
private sector information, and establish methods to ensure oversight and
accountability.

Congress should do the following:
1. Undertake to review the performance of federal agencies in improving analysis and
information sharing along the lines set out in this report, an din utilizing private sector
information while protecting civil liberties.
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Essentially, the task force recommended a horizontal information sharing solution. Their
proposed architecture is very good for solving problems where the analyst is looking for specific
pieces of information about something. This supports Clark’s contention that intelligence
analysis needs to be target-centric (Clark, 2004) and there has to be an a priori question to
explore. Case studies of solved crimes from the Florida Data Sharing Model using pawn data
retrieved by item description, or defendant name are proof of this. (Wang, 2004, ¶ 2) From a
national perspective, sharing watch lists is the perfect example of an appropriate problem for the
distributed architecture to solve. In fact, the DHS is now looking at using XML 14 to support
counter terror data sharing. (Menke, 2004, ¶ 4). Technical architecture, including XML can help
integrate disparate information systems.

Technical Architecture Solutions
Historically, it has been difficult to integrate disparate information systems. Differences
in operating system, computer programming language, and databases made it necessary for
software adapters 15 to be written specifically for each combination of technology. This led to
very expensive integration efforts.
A technical architecture provides the means to implement an overall information sharing
model. For example, a business intelligence or portal solution may be implemented using either
a consolidated reporting database, or a service-oriented architecture. There is not a one-to-one

14

XML stands for Extensible Markup Language. It provides flexible and adaptable information identification. For
example, a person’s name might be represented by <FullName>Person’s Name </FullName>. XML eliminates
some of the complexity typically found when integrating disparate information systems.
15
A software adapter is analogous to a physical fitting or coupling. For example, when the space station was built,
it provided adapters so that both the United States and Russian versions of the shuttle could connect to it.
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mapping between an overall information sharing model and a technical architecture. This
section describes some of the more common technical architectures that can be combined to
support integrated justice initiatives.
Calling a Service – A Business Analogy
For years, software programming languages have sought to encapsulate functionality
within objects that contain properties and methods. A service is “a fundamental building block
that combines information and behavior, hides the internal workings from outside intrusion, and
presents a very simple interface” to the consumer. (MSDN 2004, p. 2) Consider this human
example. Not so many years ago, if you wanted to find out where your UPS package was, you
picked up the telephone and you called the UPS Customer Service Desk. You asked the
customer service representative to track your package and you provided a tracking number so
that the Customer Service Representative (CSR) could perform the lookup. The CSR looked up
the package status in the UPS package tracking computer system, and told you where the
package was, and when it was expected to be delivered. The concept of calling a ‘method’ on an
‘object’ is identical to this. Instead of using the telephone, a computer program receives the
request to track the package with the tracking number built into it. The computer program looks
into the same UPS package tracking database, and returns information to the calling program
about where the package is, and when it is expected to be delivered.
Service Interfaces
A user interface is the window, or screen, that a person sees when they are running a
computer application, or accessing a web page. Behind this visible part of the software are many
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different pieces. The first piece is the presentation layer. This layer positions the graphics and
text on the application, and captures the data that the user enters in any fields on the screen.
The presentation layer calls another layer, called the business layer that contains business
rules such as ‘send the data to the purchasing database.’ A way to make the business
functionality accessible is called a service interface. A service-interface is created, like the
telephone call described previously that provides a way for the business layer functionality to be
accessed programmatically over a network. Service interfaces can be created using a variety of
technologies, from HTTP Post, to web services, to the Distributed Component Object Model
(DCOM) or the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA).
The first service-oriented architectures for many people in the past was with the use of
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) or Object Request Brokers (ORBs) based on the
CORBA specification” (NGA.ORG, 2003, slide 8). These older technologies tended to be
vendor-specific. Microsoft created DCOM. IBM, Sun and other vendors participated in the
CORBA standard. Neither was open enough to promote universal interoperability. This opened
the door to what is now called “web services”. A web service is what results when the “service
interface is described and exposed using the XML-based standards such as SOAP, and WSDL.”
(MSDN, 2003, p. 7). Putting web services together into architecture requires that you also
include the pieces of the system that interact with the user community, or that perform the
process-focused integrations between systems.
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A service interface is shown in the following diagram:
Service
Service Interface
• Common Encapsulation
• Common Alphabet, language, format
• Common security
• Common error handling, …

Business Layer

Data Access Layer

SQL

Flat
File

XML

Figure 6 – Service Interface

Service-Oriented Architecture
Much of existing literature and system documentation confuses the concepts of web
services and service-oriented architecture 16 (SOA). “SOA is not just an architecture of services
seen from a technology perspective, but the policies, practices, and frameworks by which we
ensure the right services are provided and consumed.” (MSDN 2004, p. 3) Service Oriented
Architectures are a way of assembling services to perform business functions, not merely a
collection of services that are called. Service Oriented Architectures are not a new thing.
According to the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, “SOA is a businessdriven, open standards software technology system development process, built on existing
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infrastructure (e.g. NLETS 17 , LETS 18 , and the U.S. Department of Labor) to enable information
sharing at the local, state, and national levels that respects current diversity and heterogeneity”
(Global Justice, 2003, p. 3). “A service-oriented architecture is essentially a collection of
services. These services communicate with each other. The communication can involve either
simple data passing or it could involve two or more services connecting some activity.”
(NGA.ORG, 2003, slide 8).
Table 1. - Web services and SOA (MSDN 2004, p. 4)
Enabled by Web services

Enabled by SOA

Technology neutral

Endpoint platform independence.

Standardized

Standards-based protocols.

Consumable

Enabling automated discovery and usage.

Reusable

Use of Service, not reuse by copying of
code/implementation.

Abstracted

Service is abstracted from the implementation.

Published

Precise, published specification functionality of
service interface, not implementation.

Formal

Formal contract between endpoints places
obligations on provider and consumer.

Relevant

Functionality presented at a granularity
recognized by the user as a meaningful service.

16

In this context, the word architecture is used to describe how
The National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS) was created by the principal law
enforcement agencies of the states nearly 35 years ago.” (NLETS, 2004) It serves the justice community at multiple
levels and provides a way for law enforcement to share justice information across state boundaries.
18
The Law Enforcement Tactical System (LETS) is a system created by the State of Alabama to promote interstate
information sharing.
17
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Service-oriented architectures have many benefits when implemented properly (MSDN
2004, p. 4):
•

There is real synchronization between the business and IT implementation
perspective. For many years, business people haven't really understood the IT
architecture. With well designed services we can radically improve communications
with the business, and indeed move beyond alignment and seriously consider
convergence of business and IT processes.

•

A well formed service provides us with a unit of management that relates to
business usage. Enforced separation of the service provision provides us with basis
for understanding the life cycle costs of a service and how it is used in the business.

•

When the service is abstracted from the implementation it is possible to consider
various alternative options for delivery and collaboration models. … However it
is entirely realistic to assume that certain services will be acquired from external
sources because it is more appropriate to acquire them. For example authentication
services, a good example of third party commodity services that can deliver a superior
service because of specialization, and the benefits of using a trusted external agency
to improve authentication.

Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) implies that it “is critical to implement processes
that ensure that there are at least two different and separate processes – for provider and
consumer.” (MSDN 2004, p. 5). In a service oriented architecture, “what we have is a
significant number of process areas where (depending on the nature of the service) there is deep
collaboration between provider and consumer. Potentially we have a major reengineering of the
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software delivery process. Although we have two primary parties to the service-based process,
there are three major process areas” (MSDN 2004, p. 5) that need to be managed: delivering the
service implementation, provisioning of the service – the life cycle of the service as a reusable
artifact, and the consumption process.
It is important to follow a top-down process when defining an overall service-oriented
architecture, so that the overall business processes are accomplished. Several modeling
techniques can be used to do this, such as use-cases, or Unified Modeling Language (UML) 19 .
The simplest form of use-cases is written from a business stake holder’s perspective and describe
an interaction with a system from the time a user interacts with a screen in the application, to
how the system executes specific program code to implement the user’s instructions. Use-cases
can be decomposed into their component parts which can then be implemented with appropriate
technology such as services and components. When creating an overall system, all of the usecases for the system can be defined, they can then be analyzed into supporting processes and
core business processes. The supporting processes can be implemented by creating service
interfaces to the various systems being integrated. This is an overall development process that
should be familiar to any enterprise-class developer.

19

Unified Modeling Language (UML) is the way that many information technology professionals model not only
application structure, behavior, and architecture, but also business process and data structure. A model plays the
analogous role in software development that blueprints and other plans (site maps, elevations, physical models) play
in the building of a skyscraper. Using a model, those responsible for a software development project's success can
assure themselves that business functionality is complete and correct, before implementation in code renders
changes difficult and expensive to make.
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Sample Use-Case: Anonymous Tip that Someone is a Terrorist
An anonymous caller calls 9-11 and provides a tip that a person is a terrorist.

Assumptions 20 :
5. The caller is unknown.
6. The validity of the call is not known.

Actors: 21
Caller, FIR system, local analyst, national analyst, 9-11 operator

Basic Course 22
1. Anonymous Caller calls 9-11.
2. 9-11 operator answers the phone.
3. Results of call are documented on a field investigative report (FIR) form. Checkbox on the
form is checked to indicate indicates possible terrorist activity.
4. The 9-11 operator and the system both route the information to the “analyst”
5. Information (person, location, and tactic) is documented in a local intelligence database.
6. Local “analyst” determines validity of claim by dispatching a detective to investigate.
7. If the information is deemed to be ‘qualified’, it is ‘shared’ with a national intelligence
database from the person, location, and tactic (target-centric) perspectives.
In the next section, we turn from technical considerations to research questions.

20
21

The assumptions state what is true before the use case begins.
Actors are the people, or systems that are involved in the use-case.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
The approach to be used is based on Robert K. Yin Case Study Research
Design 23 . The unit of analysis is a specific integrated information system. Raw data describing
the integrated systems and their business context was gathered using a combination of surveys,
one-on-one interviews, and focus groups. Integration and Interoperability requirements (shown
as R1 – Rn below) were gathered from stakeholders in the law enforcement intelligence
community in an interview format, and by inspection of written project artifacts. The systems
were evaluated for their ability to meet the interoperability and interconnection requirements
using a matrix such as the following:
Table 2 - Requirements Matrix

R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R… Rn JTTF
System
[0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9]
[0-9] [0-9]
Florida Law
Enforcement
Data Sharing
[0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9]
[0-9] [0-9]
Alabama Law
Enforcement
Tactical System
Portal
Orange County [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9] [0-9]
Integrated
Criminal Justice
Information
System
[0[0[0[0[0[0[0[0-27] [0[0-27]
Total: [027]
27]
27]
27]
27]
27]
27]
27]
27]

LEA
[0-9]

[0-9]

[0-9]

[0-27]

In addition, specific qualitative observations were documented.

22

The Basic course is the way that the process will occur 90% or more of the time. An alternate course describes
what might happen if a condition in the basic course, or an assumption is not true.
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Business Process
Normally, when an information sharing system is designed, the first item to start with to
begin to shape the system is the business requirements. For example, when creating a statewide
integrated court system, a solution whose primary goal is to provide policy makers with
evaluation information on the previously implemented projects (such as number of probate cases
processed) will be a very different solution than one whose goal is to allow every circuit to be
able to search the cases in every other circuit. In the case of intelligence information sharing, not
only do no requirements exist at a detailed enough level to be useful, but even when they are
known, the stakeholders in the processes are entrenched in doing business as usual. In this case,
we will resolve these issues by inspecting the attempts of the various governmental entities
involved in intelligence information sharing, homeland security, and international defense, as
well as by inspecting the possibilities afforded by combining the regional information sharing
initiatives.
Questions
These are the questions that were asked during the course of the interviews, or inspection of
system documentation.

Business Questions
1. How is the governance of the integration solution structured?
2. Does the governance structure interact with the governance structure of any other integration
solutions/

23

Yin, Robert K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. California: Sage
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3. Is the data shared real-time?
4. Who are the stakeholders in the information sharing initiative?
5. At a high-level, what data (e.g. people, places, things) is being shared?
6. Are there any state or federal laws governing access to the records?
7. Is there data that the participants would like to share that is not currently accessible?
8. What considerations for accessibility by Federal homeland security agencies were designed
into the system?
9. How many collectors are feeding the system?

Technical Questions
1. What are the source data systems?
2. What is the architecture of the solution?
3. Is the architecture scaleable?
4. Is the solution experiencing performance problems?
5. What steps were taken to ensure network security?
Requirements for National Information Sharing
These requirements were developed by examining the literature with respect to
information sharing and intelligence, and discerning requirements from the overall goals found
in the literature.
Also note that the ability or the inability of any of the regional systems to meet these
requirements should not be viewed as a deficiency in the regional system, as the initial goal of
the regional system may not have had anything to do with the goals of a national intelligence
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information sharing effort. The reason for comparing these systems to these national
requirements is simply to evaluate how feasible the Markle task force recommendations are in
connecting the existing disparate systems.

Study Variables
The following variables were developed to measure and evaluate the various components
of the cases under study.
R1: Ability to search for data related to a specific person.
In order for data about a person to be shared between jurisdictions, there must be a way to
search for the person in each system.
Table 3 – Ratings for Person Searching

Rating

Criteria

0

There is no ability to search for data related to
a person in the system
There is ability to search for data related to a
person by name only.
System possesses the ability to search for data
related to a person by name and a specific
identifier such as driver’s license or social
security number.
System possesses the ability to search for data
by name, social security number, driver’s
license, date of birth, gender, and race.
System possesses the ability to search for data
by biometric, name, social security number,
drivers license, date of birth, gender, and race.

3
5

7

9
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R2: Data Accuracy
This requirement refers to the overall data accuracy. An example of accuracy in a data
sharing system is to make sure the data in the evaluated system is tied to the correct target
(person or address). The General Accounting Office (GAO) describes accuracy as reflecting
“the data entered at the source or, if available, in the source documents.” They further define a
subcategory of accuracy to be consistency which “refers to the need to obtain and use data that
are clear and well-defined enough to yield similar results in similar analyses. For example, if
data are entered at multiple sites, inconsistent interpretation of data rules can lead to data that
taken as a whole are unreliable.” (GAO, 2002, p.8) Consistency is not considered in this rating
because it is up to each agency contributing data to provide for consistency.
Table 4 – Ratings for Data Accuracy

Rating
0
7
9

Criteria
The system has no capability to ensure data
accuracy.
The system receives data as published by
agencies providing data.
The system receives data as published by
agencies providing data and periodically
performs automatic audits to verify that data
matches the agencies’ source data.

R3: Data Completeness
This requirement refers to the overall completeness of the data. The GAO defines
completeness as containing “all of the data elements and records needed for the engagement.”
(GAO, 2002, p.8) An example of completeness refers to the percentage of time that the driver’s
license value for a person is filled into the data field. This rating refers to the systems ability to
measure and manage overall completeness, not the actual data completeness itself.
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Table 5 – Ratings for Data Completeness

Rating

Criteria

0

The system has no capability to ensure data
completeness.
The system operators periodically measure
completeness through query operation and
communicate completeness to the operators of
the source system on key fields.
The system has automatic capabilities to
measure completeness and provide feedback to
the source systems.

5

9

R4: Agency Participation
Are all of the ‘right’ agencies participating in the information sharing initiative? For
example, if parking tickets are deemed to be relevant to the information sharing effort, is the
agency that issues the parking tickets part of the information sharing solution?
Table 6 – Ratings for Agency Participation

Rating

Criteria

0

The system has 0% of the targeted agencies
participating participation.
The system has 25% of the targeted agencies
participating
The system has 50% of the targeted agencies
participating.
The system has 75% of the targeted agencies
participating.
The system has 100% of the targeted agencies
participating.

3
5
7
9
R5: Person Identification

Person identification is one of the more problematic aspects of the problem of
information sharing. Constitutional factors, as well as current policy debate are precluding the
creation of a national identification card, or national biometric for identifying persons residing in
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this country. This is one of the key issues that will need to be resolved in order to gain the most
benefit from national information sharing initiatives. This requirement states that the system
needs to have some way to identify a person within the system.
Table 7 – Ratings for Person Identification

Rating

Criteria

0

The system only uses name to identify a
person.
The system has an internally generated unique
identifier to identify a person.
The system has an internally generated unique
identifier to identify a person which is tied to a
non-biometric government-issued unique
identifier such as a driver’s license.
The system has some local biometric
capabilities, or leverages AFIS data in addition
to having an internally generated unique
identifier to identify a person which is tied to a
non-biometric government-issued unique
identifier such as a driver’s license.
The system incorporates a national, biometric
unique identifier in addition to all criteria for a
rating of 7.

3
5

7

9

R6: Leverages a Decentralized Network Approach
One requirement is that a decentralized network approach be taken. The system should
not require centralization of data or process in order to operate.
Table 8 – Ratings for Decentralized Network Approach

Rating

Criteria

0
5

The system is centralized.
The system is a hybrid between centralized and
decentralized.
The system is completely decentralized.

9
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R7: Supports an Overall Intelligence Analysis Process
In this requirement, the regional information sharing systems’ ability to support a higherlevel intelligence analysis process is evaluated. Specifically, what data does each system
provide for use by others in the intelligence community?
Table 9 – Ratings for Overall Intelligence Analysis Process

Rating

Criteria

0

The system provides access to no data for use
by others in the intelligence community.
The system provides access to person
information, and criminal history information
The system provides access to person
information, criminal history information,
address information, and field investigative
report information
The system provides access to person
information, criminal history information, field
investigative report information, activity at
address information, and 9-11 call
information, and traffic ticket information.
The system provides access to, criminal history
information, field investigative report
information, and 9-11 call information, traffic
ticket information, and local intelligence
products.

3
5

7

9

R8: Flexibility to Change as the Intelligence Analysis Processes Change
It is apparent that the overall process for intelligence analysis and information sharing has
not yet been defined. This deficiency means that each regional information system needs to be
built to adapt to future needs by having a flexible architecture.
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Table 10 – Ratings for Intelligence Process Change

Rating

Criteria

0

The system would need to be re-designed
completely to be able to support changing
intelligence processes.
The system architecture would need some
modification to support changing intelligence
processes.
The system architecture needs no modification
to support changing intelligence processes.

5

9
R9: Provides for “tasking”

A key means of operation in the intelligence is that the intelligence analysts are able to
respond to “taskings”. In turn, they may need to “task” the individual collectors of raw data to
be analyzed. The requirement stated here is that the system have some way to respond to a
“tasking” for specific information, such as, “keep an eye out for suspicious activity around power
plants” that would find its way to the law enforcement or private agency data collectors.
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Table 11 – Ratings for Support of Taskings

Rating
0

5

7

9

Criteria
The system would need to be re-designed
completely to be able to support taskings
intelligence processes.
The system architecture would need moderate
modification to support taskings back to law
enforcement.
The system architecture needs minor
modification or customization to support
taskings or BOLOs back to law enforcement.
The system can be configured to support
taskings back to law enforcement.

R10: Ability to Search by Location
The ability to search for an event by location is also important
Table 12 – Ratings for Search by location

Rating

Criteria

0
5

The system does not support search by location
The system contains the data to search by
location, but no facilities to query that data.
The system supports search by location, and
can bring up related events.

9

R11: Ability to Search by Keyword
The ability to search for an event in each regional system by keyword is also important
for allowing analysts to search for specific type of incidents or events, such as “TNT”, or “flight
training.”
Table 13 – Ratings for Search by keyword

Rating
0
5

Criteria
The system architecture does not support
keyword searching
The system architecture technically supports
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9

keyword searching.
The system supports keyword searching for
data fields and document narratives

R12: Documentation
In order for a system to be integrated with another system, documentation describing the system
and its data elements needs to be available, as does information exchange packet documentation.
Table 14 – Ratings for Documentation

Rating

Criteria

0
5

The system does not have documentation.
The system has user documentation and some
technical documentation.
The system follows a system development
methodology which provides for user
documentation, design documentation, and
technical documentation. Some documentation
has been created.
The system follows a documented
methodology and all documentation in the
methodology has been created.

7

9
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This chapter presents the results of the research specific to each regional system,
and how well they meet the requirements for national information sharing that were defined
earlier in this document.
Specific Integration Solution Findings
This section presents the findings for each one of the case study systems. For each system, we
describe the political environment, business problem being solved, agencies participating as of
this writing, business process findings, technical findings, and the evaluation matrix.

Alabama Law Enforcement Tactical System Portal (LETS)
The Alabama Law Enforcement Tactical System (LETS) “is an integrated justice information
system (IJIS) designed to unify the state’s vast data resources – such as Motor Vehicle
Department (MVD), court, and correctional facility records – which were disparately hosted and
difficult for outside users to search.” (Microsoft, 2003) In the regular course of law enforcement
business, it is useful to be able to access driver’s license records, jail records, law enforcement
record management system records from other jurisdictions, and the court system. The
conceptual business requirement for this system falls into the consolidated reporting category.
The information from each jurisdiction conceptually is combined into a big-picture view that can
be looked at from an overall state perspective. Due to financial and jurisdictional requirements,
the LETS portal provides a mechanism to achieve this goal without actually consolidating the
actual data in each jurisdictions database. It is a true portal. One of the key design aspects of
this system was that “The SAICS task force wanted to leave the data “as is” as much as
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possible…We did not want to do a data warehouse approach, in which data is cleaned up and
massaged into a specific format. SAICS participants got to keep autonomy of their databases”
(GCN, 2003, ¶6)
Political Environment
LETS was created because all agencies at the state level could not share information, and
because creating a consolidated data warehouse for the information was cost-prohibitive to the
State of Alabama. The agencies were open to making their data available to other Alabama
agencies. The type of information that the Alabama agencies wanted to share included drivers
licenses, drivers history, pardons and paroles, warrants, protection orders, and local jail data.
The portal itself was modeled after a project in Nebraska. A. Parrish (personal communication,
April 11, 2005)
Agencies Participating
The agencies participating in LETS include jail facilities, law enforcement, and courts
(prosecutors, judges) throughout Alabama. The system has over 4500 users. (Microsoft, 2003)
Business Process Findings
The Alabama LETS system provides inquiry into multiple agencies data. It does not
require any business process changes by any of the participating agencies.
Technical Findings
The Alabama LETS Portal was created using Microsoft .NET and C# for its
programming environment, Microsoft SQL Server 2000 for its database, and Microsoft Internet
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Information Server for its webserver. In some cases, data is replicated to the portal database and
in some cases data is queried directly.
Funding Source
The project was initially funded by a $12,000,000 Congressional earmark.
Evaluation Matrix
Table 15 – Alabama LETS Requirement Matrix

Requirement
R1: Ability to search for data by
person

R2: Data Accuracy

R3: Data Completeness
R4: Agency Participation
R5: Person Identification
R6: Leverage Decentralized
Network Approach
R7: Supports Intelligence
Analysis Process
R8: Flexibility to Change as
Intelligence Analysis Processes
Change
R9: Provides for “tasking”

R10: Search by Location
R11: Search by Keyword
R12: Documentation

Comments
90% of system access is performed by driver’s license
number. Other data that can be used to search for a person
includes social security number, name, address, gender, race,
county of residence.
Data quality in LETS is reflective of the data available in each
participating agencies’ systems. Data included is driver’s
licenses, driving history, pardons, paroles, warrants,
protection orders, local jails.
Data is as complete as the source data systems

NLETS
Rating
7

7

5

Agencies that participate include corrections, courts, and law
enforcement.
The primary key for a person is driver’s license number.

9

This system is built using a decentralized approach.

5

The system can be queried in support of intelligence analysis
by person, location, or any other available information
The system is designed to provide a state-level view of the
data in all of the jurisdictions in Alabama. It was not
designed to be flexible enough to support changing
intelligence analysis processes.
The system is not designed to support the concept of
‘taskings’ back to an agency to get additional information. It
is a portal system designed to view existing information.
The system can be queried by location.

3

The system cannot be searched by specific keyword, although
it can be searched by specific data fields.
The system has no overall plan in writing that can be shared,
but a case study is available on Microsoft’s web site.
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7

7

0

9
5
0

Florida Data Sharing Initiative

Political Environment
The Florida Data Sharing Network (FINDER) was created in an environment where
agencies were initially reluctant to share information by providing access to their internal
computer network, or by providing their data to a central repository such as a data warehouse.
The technical architecture that was created for FINDER alleviated the political concerns of the
participating agencies.
Agencies Participating
FINDER has broad support within the State of Florida law enforcement community. Current
members of FINDER include: Alachua County Sheriff's Office, Altamonte Springs Police
Department, Brevard County , Sheriff's Office, Charlotte County Sheriff's Office, Citrus County
Sheriff's Office, Collier County Sheriff's Office, Flagler County Sheriff's Office, Hillsborough
County Sheriff's Office, Kissimmee Police Department, Lake County Sheriff's Office, Marion
County Sheriff's Office, Orange County Sheriff's Office, Orlando Police Department, Osceola
County Sheriff's Office, Polk County Sheriff's Office, Port Orange Police Department/Reg Com
Cntr, Port St Lucie Police Department, Seminole County Sheriff's Office, Tampa Police
Department, University of Central Florida Police Department, and the Winter Garden Police
Department.
The 8 current Affiliate members include: Bunnell Police Department, Edgewater Police
Department, Lake Mary Police Department, Longwood Police Department, New Smyrna Beach
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Police Department, Oviedo Police Department, Sanford Police Department, Winter Springs
Police Department
The 21 agencies that are currently processing the memorandum of understanding include:
Belleair Beach Police Department, Belleair Police Department, Broward County Sheriff's Office,
Chipley Police Department, Clay County Sheriff's Office, Clearwater Police Department,
Gulfport Police Department, Indian Shores Police Department, Jacksonville Sheriff's Office Duval County, Kenneth City Police Department, Largo Police Department, Lee County Sheriff's
Office, Miami Police Department, Pinellas County DJC/Sheriff's Office, Pinellas Park Police
Department, Plant City Police Department, St Pete Beach Police Department, St Petersburg
Police Department, Tarpon Springs Police Department, Treasure Island Police Department
Washington County Sheriff's Office. In addition, verbal commitment has been obtained
from 28 other agencies within the State of Florida,
Business Process Findings
FINDER is an inquiry-only system. Because of this, the business processes from each
agency remain independent.
Technical Findings
FINDER was designed and implemented using state-of-the-art technology. In the
FINDEr architecture, each agency hosts and maintains a set of inquiry web services outside of
their internal network. These services allow other agencies to request and retrieve information
from other agencies. (Eaglin, Reynolds, Flint, 2003). The architecture is shown in the figure
below:
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Figure 7 – FINDER Architecture

Funding Source
FINDER is funded through a combination of agency contributions based on agency size,
seed funding provided by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, and grants.
Evaluation Matrix
Table 16 –Florida Data Sharing (FINDER) Requirement Matrix

Requirement
R1: Ability to search for data by
person
R2: Data Quality
R3: Data Completeness
R4: Agency Participation
R5: Person Identification
R6: Leverage Decentralized
Network Approach

Comments
Data can be searched by person name, driver’s license and
social security number
This is dependent on the quality of the participating agencies’
underlying data
This is dependent on the quality of the participating agencies’
underlying data
Agency participation is good

FINDER
Rating
7

Person identification is reliant on driver’s license and social
security number
FINDER has a very decentralized architecture
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7
5
7
7
9

Requirement
R7: Supports Intelligence
Analysis Process
R8: Flexibility to Change as
Intelligence Analysis Processes
Change

R9: Provides for “tasking”
R10: Search by Location
R11: Search by Keyword
R12: Documentation

Comments
FINDER provides data that could be used by an analyst.
There may be more relevant data available that could be
published using FINDER’s architecture.
FINDER is built using an easy-to-extend web services
architecture. The difficulty in change will be that the
agencies feeding FINDER will need to change their systems
to provide additional data. FINDER itself is very easy to
modify.
The FINDER architecture does not support pushing
information back to an agencies operational system
There is no current search by location, but the address
information is stored in the database
There is no current keyword search

FINDER
Rating
5

FINDER has a technical installation manual, but no design
documentation was provided.

9

5
5
5
5

Orange County Integrated Criminal Justice Information System
In 1993, three Criminal Justice Process focused committees (executive, management,
technical) were created at the recommendation of the Kalmanoff and Coopers & Lybrand
studies. These were called the Justice Information Teams. Today, the Criminal Justice/Public
Safety Coordinating Council functions as the executive level committee. The committees’
mission was to develop short term and long-term technical solutions to improve the efficiencies
of the criminal justice community within Orange County. The teams are comprised of dedicated
individuals from Court Administration, Clerk of Court, State Attorney, Public Defender, Orange
County Sheriff, Orlando Police Department, Florida Department Corrections, Orange County
Information Systems and Services, and Orange County Corrections Department.
In 1998, the JIT teams held a retreat to focus on specific data sharing opportunities to
help all agencies improve efficiencies. The result of this retreat was consensus on the need for
an integrated criminal justice system (ICJIS). Another important criterion for the creation of
ICJIS was the requirement that each agency continues to meet their independent taxpayer service
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objectives. For this reason, they need to maintain independent information systems that support
their service objectives. An independent consulting company, Nichols Research, was engaged to
identify a means to achieve these objectives. The Nichols’ recommendation included a
middleware solution to push and pull data between the systems using XML or other open
systems architecture. They also assessed each agency’s readiness to participate in an integrated
middleware system. The Nichols study results from 1999 can be found online at
http://www.orangecountyfl.net/dept/County_Admin/public_safety/CJC/ICJIS/default.htm
Subsequent to this, an RFI was created to gather information on available middleware
solutions. Vendors with traditional Enterprise Application Integration infrastructures presented
their solutions. Subsequent to the RFI, the National Center for State Courts was engaged to
create an RFP requesting specific pricing for their middleware solutions.
The Jail Oversight Commission as described in the Nichols study independently validated
the need for an ICJIS system in 2002. Also in 2002, a facilitation project to help the CJIS
agencies understand ICJIS at a functional level was performed.
Beginning in October 2002, detailed requirements gathering began for Phase I of ICJIS.
These requirements were gathered primarily from the back-end (records departments) of the
agencies’ operations. Business scenarios were documented to crystallize the requirements for
data movement throughout the Integrated Criminal Justice System. Opportunities for
incremental process improvement were also identified.
Goals
Orange County’s Integrated Criminal Justice Information System (ICJIS) is intended to
improve decision-making and operational efficiencies by eliminating redundant data entry and
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improving access to criminal justice system information throughout the entire Orange County
Criminal Justice System.

Contained within ICJIS will be the ability to identify a defendant in a

common manner throughout the entire justice processes. End-users also need to have the ability
to create reports from the CJIS data, and access the data in text or graphical form.
Logical Design
The Integrated Criminal Justice Information System (ICJIS) connects each agency’s operational
system, while also providing an architecture that allows each individual Criminal Justice Agency
to leverage their investment in their existing systems. This is shown in the Logical Design
below.
future

Public
Access

UCF
FINDER

Law Enforcement
Person Data

Clerk of Court

Public
Defender

Case Data

ICJIS Hub

Florida Department
of Corrections

State
Attorney

Orange County
Corrections
Judiciary

Figure 8 – Orange County ICJIS Logical Diagram

As shown in the figure above, the ICJIS system is designed to be a hub and spoke
architecture that connects the agencies within Orange County to share person and case data.
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Political Environment
In the startup phase of the operational part of the project (2002-2003), there was some
stated disbelief by technical staff in several of the agencies that the project would actually be a
success. Two things were done to overcome this resistance. First, a small initial phase was
scoped out that essentially would prove the data sharing approach, and could be performed with
minimal staff and resources. Second, and most importantly, the executive level committee
supported the ICJIS concept, and continued to support the project during the time it took to prove
the technical feasibility.
Agencies Participating
Initial agencies participating in ICJIS include Florida 9th Judicial Circuit agencies: Court
Administration, Clerk of Court, State Attorney, and Public Defender. The Orange County and
Municipal agencies involved include the Sheriff, Orlando Police Department, Orange County
Information Systems and Services, and the Orange County Corrections Department. The Florida
Department of Corrections is also an initial participant.
Business Process Findings
In this project, the business processes are of primary importance. Cross-Agency
processes are documented and analyzed prior to system automation, as many opportunities to
improve efficiencies through technology can be found.
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Technical Findings
This system is implemented using Microsoft code blocks, C#, Microsoft BizTalk Server
2004, and Oracle 9i. All external integrations are performed using GJXDM 24 .
Funding Source
This project is funded by the Orange County Board of County Commissioners.
Currently, three phases of the project including arrest data, court data, and imaging are funded.
Evaluation Matrix
This is the evaluation matrix for the Orange County Integrated Criminal Justice System.
Table 17 – Orange County Integrated Criminal Justice System Requirement Matrix

Requirement
R1: Ability to search for data by
person
R2: Data Quality

R3: Data Completeness

Comments
ICJIS contains a global person index with fields including
state identification number, sheriff’s jacket number, FBI
number, name,
Data quality is dependent on the accuracy of initial data entry
by the original data creator. Training law enforcement and
other agency personnel that their data entry is what counts is
of critical importance.
The ICJIS data, other than the global person index and global
case index is being created on a forward-looking basis only, so
historical data is not currently planned to be available. In
addition, it is rare for all of the data elements, such as
business address to be filled in on the charging documents
that are sent to ICJIS. Finally, ICJIS does not contain all of
the data of interest to intelligence analysts, such as FIR’s.

24

ICJIS
Rating
7

7

5

The Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) schema that is
intended to be used in all justice-related information exchanges. When agencies need to share information, they
select a subset of the data elements in the data model to exchange, and exchange the data using GJXDM as a guide.
It is a product of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative's (Global) Infrastructure and Standards Working
Group (ISWG).
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Requirement
R4: Agency Participation

R5: Person Identification

R6: Leverage Decentralized
Network Approach

R7: Supports Intelligence
Analysis Process

R8: Flexibility to Change as
Intelligence Analysis Processes
Change

R9: Provides for “tasking”

R10: Search by Location
R11: Search by Keyword

R12: Documentation

Comments
ICJIS has participation by the key criminal justice
stakeholders within Orange County and the Florida 9th
Judicial Circuit. It is expanding to include the Florida
Department of Children & Families, the Florida Department
of Juvenile Justice, and the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement. Other agencies that could be included could be
the agencies that write parking tickets.
ICJIS processes are integrated with fingerprint identification
processes for defendants, however, other persons that may
need to be searched for in the system are not biometrically
identified. A person index that supports non-biometric
person identification (e.g. drivers license, social security
number, other demographics) is being developed for the civil
side of the integration.
ICJIS uses GJXDM and standard information exchange
packages to interact with external systems. It is only reliant
on centralization within Orange County agencies (vertical
integration). It is designed to integrate with other regional
systems that use GJXDM and web services for
communication.
ICJIS was not designed specifically to support the process of
intelligence analysis. It is designed to support integration of
person and case data within Orange County so that a true
and accurate picture of a defendant within Orange County
could be obtained at any point in time.
ICJIS is built using a very flexible, modifiable architecture.
The tools chosen for use, including the GJXDM schema, and
the middleware tool selected provide the ability to change and
adapt to different data sources and destinations, and different
business processes.
ICJIS contains the concept of work queues at many points
within its process, so it is a natural extension to include
taskings from an intelligence consumer that would be
provided to law enforcement officers to collect.
ICJIS contains addresses of arrest, business, and home
addresses.
ICJIS has the ability to search charging documents by
keyword. ICJIS does not currently contain incident reports
or field investigative reports.
ICJIS has a strategic plan, and all subsystems are
documented with requirements documents, functional
specifications, and technical specifications. Exchanges are
also documented using Information Exchange Packages (IEP)
for GJXDM.
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ICJIS
Rating
5

7

5

3

9

9

5
9

7

Discussion
This section first summarizes the rating results. It then describes how research questions
are supported and answered by the findings. In summary, without an overall goal for
intelligence information sharing, and a defined process for performing collection and analysis
across agencies at local, state, federal, and probably international levels, any information sharing
system will only have limited success.
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Rating Summary
The following table provides a summary of the ratings for all three sections.
Table 18 – Overall Rating Summary

Requirement

Rating = 0

R1: Ability to
search for data
by person

There is no ability
to search for data
related to a person
in the system

R2: Data
Accuracy

The system has no
capability to ensure
data accuracy.

R3: Data
Completeness

The system has no
capability to ensure
data completeness.

R4: Agency
Participation

The system has 0%
of the targeted
agencies
participating
participation.

Rating = 3

Rating = 5

Rating = 7

Rating = 9

FINDER
Rating

NLETS
Rating

ICJIS
Rating

There is ability to
search for data
related to a
person by name
only.

System possesses the
ability to search for
data related to a person
by name and a specific
identifier such as
driver’s license or
social security number.

System possesses the
ability to search for
data by name, social
security number,
driver’s license, date
of birth, gender, and
race.

System possesses the
ability to search for data
by biometric, name,
social security number,
drivers license, date of
birth, gender, and race.

7

7

7

The system receives
data as published by
agencies providing
data.

The system receives data
as published by agencies
providing data and
periodically performs
automatic audits to
verify that data matches
the agencies’ source
data.

7

7

7

The system has
automatic capabilities to
measure completeness
and provide feedback to
the source systems.

5

5

5

The system has 100% of
the targeted agencies
participating.

7

9

5

The system operators
periodically measure
completeness through
query operation and
communicate
completeness to the
operators of the source
system on key fields.

The system has
25% of the
targeted agencies
participating

The system has 50% of
the targeted agencies
participating.
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Requirement

Rating = 0

R5: Person
Identification

The system only
uses name to
identify a person.

R6: Leverage
Decentralized
Network
Approach
R7: Supports
Intelligence
Analysis Process

The system is
centralized.

R8: Flexibility to
Change as
Intelligence
Analysis
Processes
Change

The system would
need to be redesigned
completely to be
able to support
changing
intelligence
processes.

The system
provides access to
no data for use by
others in the
intelligence
community.

Rating = 3

Rating = 5

Rating = 7

Rating = 9

FINDER
Rating

NLETS
Rating

ICJIS
Rating

The system has
an internally
generated unique
identifier to
identify a person.

The system has an
internally generated
unique identifier to
identify a person which
is tied to a nonbiometric governmentissued unique identifier
such as a driver’s
license.

The system has some
local biometric
capabilities, or
leverages AFIS data
in addition to having
an internally
generated unique
identifier to identify a
person which is tied
to a non-biometric
government-issued
unique identifier such
as a driver’s license.

The system incorporates
a national, biometric
unique identifier in
addition to all criteria for
a rating of 7.

7

7

7

The system is
completely
decentralized.

9

5

5

The system provides
access to person
information, criminal
history information,
field investigative
report information,
activity at address
information, and 911 call information,
and traffic ticket
information.

The system provides
access to, criminal
history information, field
investigative report
information, and 9-11
call information, traffic
ticket information, and
local intelligence
products.

5

3

3

The system
architecture would
need some
modification to
support changing
intelligence
processes.

The system architecture
needs no modification to
support changing
intelligence processes.

9

7

9

The system is a hybrid
between centralized
and decentralized.

The system
provides access
to person
information, and
criminal history
information

The system provides
access to person
information, criminal
history information,
address information,
and field investigative
report information
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Requirement

Rating = 0

Rating = 3

Rating = 5

Rating = 7
The system needs
minor modification or
customization to
support taskings back
to law enforcement or
BOLO's

Rating = 9

FINDER
Rating

NLETS
Rating

ICJIS
Rating

The system can be
configured to support
taskings back to law
enforcement.

5

0

9

R9: Provides for
“tasking”

The system would
need to be redesigned
completely to be
able to support
taskings
intelligence
processes.

The system architecture
would need moderate
modification to support
taskings back to law
enforcement.

R10: Search by
Location

The system does
not support search
by location

The system contains the
data to search by
location, but no
facilities to query that
data.

The system supports
search by location, and
can bring up related
events.

5

9

5

R11: Search by
Keyword

The system
architecture does
not support
keyword searching

The system architecture
technically supports
keyword searching.

The system supports
keyword searching for
data fields and document
narratives

5

5

9

R12:
Documentation

The system does
not have
documentation.

The system has user
documentation and
some technical
documentation.

The system follows a
documented
methodology and all
documentation in the
methodology has been
created.

5

0

7

76
70%

64
59%

78
72%

The system follows a
system development
methodology which
provides for user
documentation,
design
documentation, and
technical
documentation.
Some documentation
has been created.

Numeric Result:
Percentage Result:
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Will the Markle recommendations be sufficient to support interconnection of regional and
state systems like Alabama LETS, Florida FINDER, and Orange County, Florida?
There are several aspects of the SHARE network that support interconnecting the three
systems, although at a very high level. Creating a decentralized network is an obvious precursor
to interconnection of any regional systems. Likewise, setting specific and clear objectives for
improved information sharing which each federal agency needs to meet is good, but not
sufficient. Although federal agencies are of vital importance in intelligence information sharing,
the necessity of including the local and state agencies cannot be overlooked. Because of this, the
Markle recommendations, even for the SHARE network, should include encouraging setting
specific and clear objectives for improved information sharing between federal, local, state, and
private entities. Specific objectives were probably not included in the Markle recommendations
to avoid the probable debate about the objectives. It is important that all information sharing
participants recognize that setting federal or local intelligence analysis goals alone is not
sufficient. All agencies play a role, or roles in a single intelligence analysis process that helps
protect our Country.

Are there aspects of Alabama LETS, Florida FINDER, and Orange County, Florida that
are not sufficient to accomplish the interoperability and therefore need to change?
With respect to documentation, only the ICJIS project had sufficient process and systems
documentation. The Florida Data Sharing project provided only a user guide to review, and the
Alabama LETS project provided a case study to examine.
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One aspect of all three systems, and the recommendations, which is not sufficient, is that
all three have to work-around our lack of a national person identifier. If the benefits of a person
identifier are evaluated across all government services (health care, social services, criminal
justice, national security), a business case can be made to have one. The issues with respect to
privacy and civil liberties will need to be legislated appropriately. The ability to have a person
identifier for children is as important to protect the well being of children in domestic violence
cases as it is in tracking the activities of people for intelligence information sharing.
The Alabama LETS project and the Florida Data Sharing project are focused on data
inquiry. The ICJIS project is focused on real-time data interchange. “Tasking” domestic
collection of information (assigning collection to local law enforcement or another collector) is a
vital part of any national intelligence information sharing initiative, and only a system that
provides capabilities for real-time data interchange and human workflow control will provide the
“tasking” capability needed. This will be a challenge to implement, as it impacts the business
processes of law enforcement officers on patrol, as well as the packaged record management
systems and arrest reporting systems they use every day. Patrol may be asked to respond to
national BOLO’s for specific targets or persons. They may also be asked to provide additional
information about specific incidents if they believe that it may be terrorist-related. This is
similar to how patrol must fill out domestic violence checklists when they make a domestic
violence arrest.
Only the UCF FINDER project had a stated goal of being a model for information
sharing in support of intelligence analysis. The other two systems were not designed with this in
mind. UCF FINDER has plans to implement FIRs, however, because of the rules set forth in
Code of Federal Regulations CFR 23, part 28, there can be implications to the sharing of the FIR
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data even within different departments in an agency, let alone between agencies. This barrier
will need to be overcome, since this is an important source of information for intelligence
analysis.

What are possible insufficiencies in the Markle recommendations?
The Markle recommendations for the SHARE network are written from a national
perspective. As such, they do not really concern themselves with whether regional information
systems are interoperable. It is common for different systems to have different definitions for
words that appear to be quite simple, such as the word, “arrest.” These semantic differences
need to be resolved in internal interoperability issues. The use of a national XML standard such
as GJXDM can help alleviate this problem.
The recommendations made for DHS are good, however, they do not present the
rationale for decentralized centers. The reason for the decentralization of the centers needs to be
elaborated on. For example, if the decentralization is simply so that an agency, such as the FBI,
can maintain analytical capabilities that may not be relevant in today’s environment, that is not
necessarily a good reason for decentralization. If the decentralization is to provide redundancy
in analytical operations across all agencies, then that is a good reason for decentralization.
Reasons for centralization vs. decentralization need to be part of an overall design of our
collection and analysis capabilities.
The national recommendations for intelligence information sharing could more strongly
support the concept of a national person identifier and legislation to protect our civil liberties.
Such a person identifier is needed not only to support integrated information sharing for
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intelligence, but also to track child abuse cases, and court cases for specific individuals across
civil and criminal courts.
The regional systems that support cross-agency inquiry need to be combined with those
that exchange data, so that workflow-oriented requirements such as intelligence analysis can be
accomplished. For example, if a patrol officer needs to notify a local intelligence analyst that a
victim on a domestic violence incident implicated the defendant as a terrorist, then a workflow
process needs to be instituted to make sure that the information is passed on to the local
intelligence analyst. Furthermore, if the data needs to be passed to an analyst with a broader
perspective, then that handoff also needs to take place.
Most importantly, we need to have an overall model for intelligence analysis that
incorporates the capabilities that law enforcement has for collection and analysis in with the
federal capabilities for collection and analysis. There is no unified approach today across federal
agencies, let alone between federal agencies and local/state agencies. Without this approach, any
attempt to ‘share’ information will be being done from a bottom-up perspective, with sharing
being focused on sharing available data elements, not on developing additional data elements
necessary for supporting the national intelligence analysis processes.
The regional systems were each designed to solve a particular regional problem. There is
a bigger picture to consider. Given the context of an overall model for intelligence information
sharing, the regional information sharing models, whether vertical, horizontal, or reportingoriented can be combined using the overall building block patterns for information sharing to
create the desired integration and information sharing solution. This big-picture needs to be
kept in mind when designing the intelligence analysis capability, and designing what can be done
in a fusion center at each level (e.g. state vs. federal).
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Are there any non-technical, human barriers to system development and implementation?
There are still many human barriers to overall system success. Law enforcement still
believes in the concept of ‘their’ data – especially when it comes to intelligence and field
investigative reports.
The processes that exist for gathering information relevant to intelligence analysis by law
enforcement probably do not exist. Law enforcement’s rightful focus is on reacting to specific
problems that the citizens of this country and their jurisdiction encounter. This focus needs to be
expanded to be able to collect the type of data that intelligence analysts in their agency, and in
other agencies subscribing to their collected data (e.g. a federal analyst) need to do their job.
Developing the capability for law enforcement to be directed intelligence collectors is
appropriate. In addition, it is probably appropriate to suggest that mechanisms be developed for
federal agencies to be able to “task” local law enforcement to gather information on specific
physical targets or persons.
Alternatives to the SHARE Network
In this section, several alternatives to the Markle Foundation’s information sharing
network are developed. This is done to create a possible context for overall national intelligence
information sharing.

Description of Alternatives
This section describes three alternatives to proceed with implementing information
sharing for national security. The first alternative is to directly follow Baird & Barksdale’s
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(2004, ¶ 5) suggestion to build an information-sharing network based on keyword searches 25 .
The second alternative is to put in place a mechanism to build a real-time dynamic model that
represents our understanding of terrorist networks and the linkages between them. As either
local analysts provided by local law enforcement, or national intelligence analysts detect the
links, they would enter them into the overall dynamic model. The third alternative is to add the
concept of knowledge management to the concept of data sharing. This section describes each
alternative in more detail.
Watch List Sharing
The first alternative is to follow Baird & Barksdales’ recommendations, but focus the
information-sharing network on a data type that has a high probability of yielding short-term
success and doesn’t require extensive consensus building between agencies. The terrorist ‘watch
lists’ are probably the best candidate for initial information sharing.
Real-Time Terrorist Network Monitor
The next alternative is to use the information-sharing network to build a real-time
terrorist network monitor. This monitor would be built using both person information, and field
investigative report information. The data facts, combined with the history of queries by
investigators and analysts would be used to build a big-picture for decision makers. This could
be referred to as a real-time terrorist network monitor.

25

According to Vest, 2005, many police agencies do not have their records automated so that they are searchable. A
‘readiness’ assessment needs to be performed to survey the roughly 18,000 agencies involved to determine if they
even have searchable records. If not, national grants may need to be directed to automate agencies with deficient
systems if they are located in an area likely to learn information relevant to the national intelligence sharing
initiatives.
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Farley (2003, p. 404) discusses mathematical theory as it can be applied to probabilities
of breaking up terrorist cells. His research indicates that terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda,
are organized somewhat hierarchically. Schultz & Margolies (2004, p. 69) describe how alQaeda is organized vertically with a “loose horizontal structure of compartmentalized cells.”
This enables their management to accomplish missions even when cells are partially crippled by
combining or redeploying cells rapidly. Note that this is different than organized crime networks
that are typically hierarchical. According to Gunaratna (2004, p. 93), although Al Qaeda’s
strength has been greatly diminished, it has been “instilling its mission and vision in associated
groups and transferring its capabilities to them.” It is probably a good assumption that their
tactics and organization will model those of Al Qaeda, so our detection capabilities need to be
able to track meaningful information about this type of organization.
So to create an efficient near-term information-sharing tactical plan, we need to bring
together information about terrorist watch lists, mathematical concepts to model the terrorist
networks, and our knowledge of Al Qaeda-like terrorist networks. This should provide a solid
framework for framing a cohesive information sharing initiative that supports human detection
and hindrance of terrorist efforts. Figure 2 presents a highly simplified view of what this might
look like. In this view, information from the Department of Agriculture is assumed to be
available even though there is no current legislation providing this capability 26 .

26

When data is needed for intelligence analysis (e.g. agriculture, person id) that is not available because of federal
regulation, or local laws, the benefits of having the data available vs. the privacy concerns need to be addressed, and
perhaps new or modified legislation needs to be proposed.
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Large quantity of fertilizer sold
For cash to unknown person in
Altoona, PA

Seen at farm show, stopped and
Questioned (FL Dept of Ag officer)

Bank transfer from Abu Madal $50,000
Purchase of 1000 bags fertilizer

CELL

CELL

Figure 8 – Terrorist Network Monitor

The central core of this information sharing mechanism would be a computer program
that would take information about specific terrorist node connections and aggregate it in realtime to one or more central authorities terrorist network monitors. The information would be
stored as a data structure called ordered sets 27 , with attributes of an off-the-shelf customer
relationship management system that tracks details of each encounter with a customer. Each
agency participating in the information sharing effort could determine what level of information
would be shared. Additional features, such as contact history with each of the nodes could also
be stored in effect creating a shared, dynamic ‘terrorist information management system focused
on terrorist nodes. Activity in the nodes could determine the keywords that would drive queries
into the broader information-sharing network. The example in the figure would use the word,
“fertilizer” In effect, instead of agents and analysts tracking data by case, they would track it by
node and topic.

27

According to Farley (2003), “A common way to represent visually a group of people and the relationships
between them is by means of a graph or network.” This is similar to how organized crime networks are modeled.
Farley (2003) also states that “A graph inadequately represents a terrorist cell, however, because it fails to capture
the fact that, in any cell, there will most likely be a hierarchy – leaders and followers – with orders passed down
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Terrorist Threat Knowledge Management
Terrorist activities are comprised of a series of interrelated subsystems that individually
and collectively create a threat to United States public safety. We seek to obtain knowledge
about future terrorist activities by looking at vast quantities of intelligence data. In business, this
process is known as knowledge management. “The problems of decision making in complex
dynamic environments have also been examined by others, for example by Sterman (1989,
1994), whose key finding was that human performance in complex systems is poor relative to
normative standards.” (as cited in Yim, Kim, Kim, & Kwahk, 2004, p. 144). For data sharing to
be successful, we need to consider how it will be used to further the overall goal of knowledge
management. In addition, “the process of knowing, learning, and creating knowledge is the
relevant aspect. This fact candidates them as milestones for CSCW 28 research, since they offer
new conceptual categories for deepening our understanding of the intimate nature of cooperation,
and challenge us to develop systems supporting cooperation beyond the surface of synchronous
and/or asynchronous interaction.” (Agostini, Albolino, Boselli, De Michelis, De Paoli, & Dondi,
2003, p. 248)
Where the terrorist network monitor is focused on providing the big picture to central authorities,
the knowledge management solution allows local law enforcement to leverage the big picture,
without needing to explicitly know what is on the big picture.
Using knowledge management techniques as guiding principles, we could extend the
real-time terrorist network monitor to be able to learn from the collective experiences of the

from leaders to followers.” This observation can also be applied to relationships between terrorist cells which serve
other specialized functions such as supply, or implementation, and who are organized in a loose hierarchy.
28
CSCW refers to Computer-Supported Cooperative Work.
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intelligence community, the law enforcement community and other sources. This support for
long-distance cooperation could make it possible for law enforcement agencies to become aware
that others are recording incidents similar to theirs that fit a particular incident profile, and
ultimately bring this to the attention to the JTTF’s or to other intelligence community
management. 29 For example, it would be useful to a law enforcement officer who is doing an
investigation on stolen propane tanks to become aware of similar activities within a certain time
span in another geography, particularly if that geography was recently frequented by a known
terrorist cell member or members. This technique would achieve a knowledge-sharing goal
without the hierarchical organizational filtering that has the potential to screen out patterns that
need to be seen. The danger in hierarchical analysis processes is that information viewed in
isolation seems irrelevant, but when viewed in a broader context becomes vital.
In this way, we would leverage knowledge of similar queries taking place that meet
criterion for close distance, time, or tactic and gain overall knowledge of what is actually
happening and combine this with knowledge of the political, social and economic factors likely
to cause large-scale change in a region.

Comparison of Future Consequences
The three alternatives were listed from least complicated to most complicated. This
section describe future consequences of each alternative in turn.

29

This is a fundamentally different approach than the ‘share and tear’ lines referred to in the Markle report.
Information on the share line could be shared. Information on the tear line wouldn’t. The ‘share and tear’ lines
represent automation of a manual process that is probably not the best process to solve the knowledge management
problem.
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Watch List Sharing
Our reference model for data sharing, the Florida data-sharing network was created
initially to share pawn data. This was a particularly good choice since Florida State Statute
539.01(8) specifies the data fields that must be reported. As the data-sharing network expands
into different types of data, building consensus on the semantic meaning of data fields being
shared becomes more important. It is common, especially with packaged software products, for
fields to be used differently in the database than they are on the screens that users see. For
example, a database field may be named “drivers license”, however, the computer programmers
writing the program may store both passport numbers and drivers license numbers in that field,
or they may embed special codes in the field that only a computer program can decipher.
Unfortunately, this is a common occurrence in legacy information systems.
Watch list data sharing will suffer from some of these challenges. The General
Accounting Office examined the 12 watch list systems in detail and found that there were many
different types of information in the watch lists including biographic, criminal history, biometric,
immigration, and financial data. Name and birth date were the only fields shared across all of
the systems reviewed. (GAO, 2003, p. 16)
A further characteristic of this type of data sharing is its scalability. As the number of
agencies’ systems being queried increases, the speed of individual responses will be reduced.
This solution gives analysts the ability to look at watch list data across agencies, but it does not
provide us with the means to see patterns across agencies, or to learn when multiple investigators
or analysts in different agencies are looking at similar people for related reasons. For that, we
need to use a different model to frame our information sharing activities.
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Terrorist Network Monitor
The terrorist network monitor concept depends on defining an overall reference model for
the structure of terrorist networks, of the relationships between the actors in the networks, and
what events are desired or possible to monitor. A hierarchical graph or network has been
applicable to law enforcement efforts about organized crime for many years, so the knowledge of
that particular way of working within the law enforcement community will require some unlearning for the new concept to be understood and accepted.
Knowledge Management
The knowledge management solution will require the most investigation by system
designers into processes within the DOD, FBI, CIA, and other participants in the Intelligence
Community. It will also draw on advanced techniques for information and process management,
storage and retrieval. Pursuing this alternative will require strong leadership and patience.

Spillovers and externalities
Short-term information sharing initiatives can have a great benefit as long as they are
successful. If, for some reason, the early efforts do not provide a success, then it has the
possibility to derail future information sharing efforts. The human resistance goes up
exponentially when an information-sharing initiative fails. Thus, the steps taken in information
sharing need to be planned to provide benefits to stakeholders at each step along the way.
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Constraints and Political Feasibility
The three alternatives have different constraints and political feasibility as described in
this section.
Information Sharing
The basic information-sharing concept is the most palatable from a political perspective.
Agencies are naturally anti-change, and any approach, which claims to work without any
changes to the agencies’ data systems, is likely to gain immediate acceptance without political
fallout. The Markle foundation’s recommendations will work as long as the data that is being
shared is easily understood and defined. As the data that needs to be shared becomes more like
knowledge, and less like facts, the willingness to share the data, and the ease with which the data
can be shared will be reduced.
The Terrorist network monitor
The terrorist network monitor is also politically acceptable. It also minimizes the change
to the agencies’ operations. Its main purpose is to put an overall representation of the terrorist
network into place for decision-makers, and to allow local law enforcement and other
participants in the intelligence community to share analysis. One constraint will be that in any
automated system; its value is only as good as the data put into it in the first place. Again, as the
data being shared is more complex, the more the people gathering the data will need to be trained
to contribute to it ‘properly.’ The people entering the information need to be trained to enter it
effectively and consistently.
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Knowledge Management
The knowledge management solution requires the most work politically. It is an
interesting concept that could be grown incrementally. As the cooperating agencies got better at
sharing analysts, and integrating their disciplines, the value of the knowledge management
solution would grow. It would initially face political challenges, as agencies would not want to
cooperate to share highly developed analysis.
The next section of this paper describes how these policy alternatives can be combined
into a cohesive recommendation.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
Since the three alternatives are capable of being implemented in a stepwise manner, it
isn’t necessary to select between them if sufficient funding and resources are available for their
implementation; however, the order in which they can be implemented is restricted.
Criteria for recommending alternatives
The three alternatives were reviewed and ranked for their ability to produce results in a
relatively short amount of time, without requiring a large amount of consensus building.
Successful results will lead to more cooperation for the more complex information-sharing
alternatives. Unsuccessful results lead to non-cooperation and long-term project failure.
Description of preferred alternative(s)
The recommendation for policy implementation is to proceed in a stepwise manner
through the three recommendations. Initially, creating the capability for law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to search their collective watch lists for suspected terrorists would be
beneficial to all stakeholders. In getting all of the organizations in the IC to work together, it will
be best to prove that information sharing, on any scale, will lead to better defense against
terrorists.
Once the initial watch list capability exists, the next step of building the terrorist network
monitor could be taken. This would require expanding the initial data sharing initiative to
several types of reports (FIR’s, arrest reports) as well as people (watch lists). Finally, the
knowledge management solution could build on both of the first two alternatives.
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Outline of Implementation Strategy
Figure 3 shows the high-level phases that could guide an implementation strategy. The
watch list sharing, and IC process analysis begin simultaneously. The watch list sharing will
produce results. The results from the watch list sharing can drive implementation of a terrorist
network monitor. This will provide input to the knowledge management solution. As data types
are added to the information-sharing network, it can further enhance the terrorist network
monitor.

Figure 9 – High-level Implementation Strategy

Critical to the knowledge management solution is to document the specific means by
which intelligence is collected, filtered, and deemed to be important. There may need to be some
modifications to law enforcement procedures and training to accommodate the needed level of
data and knowledge sharing, in effect, allowing them to tag something as other than ‘locally’
suspicious.
Finally, the terrorist threat knowledge management solution could be implemented. This
would build on previous two recommendations and allow local law enforcement to act within the
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framework of the big picture without actually seeing it. For example, they could run parameters
of something they deemed to be suspicious (people walking by railroad yards) and the
knowledge management solution would return a yes/no flag to tell the law enforcement officer to
notify the JTTF or to proceed as usual. Essentially, the JTTF’s could create event watch lists
that would trigger when local law enforcement officers recorded one of those events.
Provisions for Monitoring and evaluation
Watch list sharing can be measured by building in the capability to count ‘hits’ when any
user queries the information-sharing network. While this is a summary measure, it will provide
the ability to track the quantity of usage, and usage that led to a successful query response.
The terrorist network monitor should also be able to be measured. As relationships
between nodes on the network are created or destroyed, they can be counted. The numbers of
known active cells, and the numbers and types of cells in a particular geography or sociopolitical
sphere can be measured. Events averted and occurred can be counted. As events occur, they can
be matched against the contents of the network to help discover new relationships between nodes
in the network. A model of the network monitor can also be created and exercised by seeding it
with fictitious data to see if the users of the system are able to predict events. This is the “red vs.
blue” team mentioned earlier in this paper. This concept would work with the terrorist network
monitor. The knowledge management solution can be evaluated the same way.
Limitations and unanticipated consequences
Information systems are limited by data quality, and limited by the people who know the
data and how to ‘enter’ the data. The effects of poor report writers will have a great impact on
the overall systems. If an officer writes a report that says, “Observed non-uniformed personnel
in the subway doing something with the switching equipment” vs. one that says “Observed non96
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uniformed personnel in the subway placing a small electronic device on the switching equipment
and apprehended suspect. Suspect appeared to be of middle-eastern descent and was carrying an
expired Egyptian visa” it is likely that one report will provide good information, and the other
won’t.
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